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Abstract
The law is stuck on binary or categorical approaches.2 One is either
this or that—heterosexual or homosexual; male or female; black or white;
and the list can go on and on.3 This article posits that this approach should
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“Human beings are an amalgam of identities—race and economic
status, etc., etc. We [do not] live our lives as demographics or as
political statements. We simply live.”1

I.

INTRODUCTION

The law is stuck on binary or categorical approaches.2 One is either
this or that—heterosexual or homosexual; male or female; black or white;
and the list can go on and on.3 This article posits that this approach should
not be the way in which we categorize people’s personhood.4 To give the
best example of why the law should rid itself of the binary approach we
purposely focus on transsexuals. They offer the best opportunity to
experience how the law so often punishes them because they do not fit into
one category.5 While the United States is slowly accepting gay and lesbian
requests for justice, that particular happenstance does not solve the problem
for transsexuals.6 Such a transformation for gays and lesbians can take place
because it is obvious that if you are gay or a lesbian, then you are not a
heterosexual, which allows the law to keep the binary approach.7 In order to
fully understand intersections of identity and the binary approach to law, it is
necessary to first look at how classifications are brought about in the social,
psychological, and biological world.8 To bring life to these heady subjects,
this Article shares with the reader actual stories of people who have to exist
in a world enamored with categories.9 Lastly, this Article explores how the

1.
Bob Minzesheimer, This Is Ayana Mathis: And When She Heard ‘This Is
Oprah Winfrey,’ Everything Changed for Debut Novelist, USA TODAY, Jan. 31, 2013, at D1.
2.
See Eric Engle, Aristotle, Law and Justice: The Tragic Hero, 35 N. KY. L.
REV. 1, 5–6, 9 n.71 (2008). Aristotle was clearly a dialectician. Id. at 2. Inequalities are
presumed unless you belong into the categories. See id. at 5–6, 10–11. The binary approach
is Aristotle’s legacy, which permeates the law as well as other disciplines. Id. at 9 n.71.
Others have suggested a new approach, however, still accept the binary approach but just
broaden it. See Julie A. Greenberg, Deconstructing Binary Race and Sex Categories: A
Comparison of the Multiracial and Transgendered Experience, 39 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 917,
919–20 (2002).
3.
See id. at 922.
4.
See infra Part XI.
5.
Greenberg, supra note 2, at 920–21.
6.
See Emily Greenhouse, Dropping the “T”: Trans Rights in the Marriage
Era, THE NEW YORKER (Apr. 5, 2013), http://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/droppingthe-t-trans-rights-in-the-marriage-era.
7.
See Greenberg, supra note 2, at 921.
8.
See infra Parts II–IV.
9.
See infra Part V.
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law approaches transsexual identity. 10 It will be apparent that we should
jettison the various identity categories and treat everyone as persons.11
II.

DEFINITIONS

Since this Article, unlike most articles, will not focus on a single
category of people, it is necessary to provide the reader with the vocabulary
that will be used. Transsexual or transgender includes many variations.12
Various politically motivated groups use the word transsexuals as an
organizing function so that the public will have a label to refer to a group of
people advocating for their rights. 13 That group, however, may have a
contingent of the following: Male-to-Female (“MTF”).14 These folks are
born with male genitalia but prefer to be considered female.15 Within that
group are those who have gone through gender reassignment surgery
(“GRS”).16 Of course, there is also Female-to-Male (“FTM”) for the women
who identify as men.17 There are also people who are transvestites, who
dress in the manner of the opposite gender from what they are.18 Included in
this group are drag kings and drag queens. 19 One of the main points to
remember is that gender identity, birth sex, and sexual orientation are
different.20 Because these variations exist on a sliding scale, there are those
10.
See infra Part VI.
11.
See infra Part XI. Making a person identify themselves has pitfalls in that
it makes a person classify themselves. Jody Lyneé Madeira, Comment, Law as a Reflection of
Her/His-Story: Current Institutional Perceptions of, and Possibilities for, Protecting
Transsexuals’ Interests in Legal Determinations of Sex, 5 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 128, 165 (2002).
The authors are not suggesting that anyone has to identify himself or herself; only to say that
they are a person. See infra Part VI. Thus, gender or sexual orientation is not the question
asked. See infra Part VI. Also, some say that allowing transsexuals to decide would
undermine the law’s consistency. Madeira, supra note 11, at 171. Such observations seem to
be based on when a person could decide. Id. It is not necessary to pinpoint when the person
who is self-identifying makes the decision. See id. at 172. Subjectively, the person should
have the power to decide. Contra id. at 171. Yes, it is true judges would, at first, need
training in this area. See id. at 172–73.
12.
Laura E. Kuper et al., Exploring the Diversity of Gender and Sexual
Orientation Identities in an Online Sample of Transgender Individuals, 49 J. SEX RES. 244,
244 (2012).
13.
Id.
14.
Transgendered Definitions, CONN. OUTREACH SOC’Y, http://
www.ctoutreach.org/faq.pdf.
15.
Id.
16.
Id.
17.
Id.
18.
Id.
19.
Transgendered Definitions, supra note 14.
20.
Madeira, supra note 11, at 171; see also JAMIE M. GRANT ET AL.,
INJUSTICE AT EVERY TURN: A REPORT OF THE NATIONAL TRANSGENDER DISCRIMINATION
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who would prefer to adopt a name that is more inclusive of everyone.21 For
instance, QUILTBAG—an acronym that stands for “Queer/Questioning,
Undecided, Intersex, Lesbian, Transgender/Transsexual, Bisexual,
Allied/Asexual, Gay/Genderqueer”—has been suggested.22 “It is meant to
be a more inclusive term than [Gay-Lesbian-Bisexual-Transgender/LesbianGay-Bisexual-Transexual
(“GLBT/LGBT”)]
and
to
be
more
pronounceable—and memorable—than some of the other variations or
extensions on the GLBT/LGBT abbreviation.”23 In one study, it was found
that the younger generation prefers not to put their identity in any category.24
They instead champion the idea of identity being fluid and contextual.25 This
group also challenges “the assumption that their sexual orientation is a core
feature of their sense of self.”26
The authors, however, will be using the term transsexuals as the
generic term, but with the caution that all of the above folks should be
included.27 Indeed, the Article will show that in many instances—depending
where you are on the scale of gender identity and sexual orientation—the law
may be particularly tricky.28
III.

SOCIETY’S TREATMENT OF IDENTITY

While race classification has received considerable discussion and
legal attention for decades, sex and gender classification systems have only
recently become the subject of litigation.29 As such, the traditional approach
has been one of adopting a binary sex classification system instead of one
that would deconstruct such a limited means of addressing human rights and
privileges.30 Of particular concern are people who are transsexual, who are
SURVEY 24 (2011), available at http://transequality.org/PDFs/NTDS_Report.pdf. The authors
stated that the survey respondents were sixty percent assigned male at birth, but twenty-nine
percent now said male was their identity. GRANT ET AL., supra note 20, at 25. Forty-two
percent said they were female. Id.
21.
See Kuper et al., supra note 12, at 248.
22.
QUILTBAG, QUEER DICTIONARY, (Mar. 16, 2011, 3:37 PM), http://
queerdictionary.tumblr.com/post/3899608042/quiltbag.
23.
Id.
24.
Kuper et al., supra note 12, at 250; GRANT ET AL., supra note 20, at 25.
Twenty-nine percent of the respondents said they were something else other than just male or
female. GRANT ET AL., supra note 20, at 25. Also, the younger respondents identified as
gender non-conforming. Id.
25.
Kuper et al., supra note 12, at 250.
26.
Id.
27.
See supra Part II.
28.
See infra Part III.
29.
See Greenberg, supra note 2, at 919.
30.
Id. at 919–20.
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forced to live in a rather twilight zone of factors that create a formidable
chasm even with some gays, lesbians and bi-sexuals who “fear that inclusion
of transgendered individuals may result in . . . rejection of legislation that
would protect GLBs from sexual orientation discrimination.”31 Given the
pervasive oppression and discrimination that has threaded its way through
decades, the “manner in which a person’s sex[ual] [orientation] is defined
has . . . significant legal consequences.”32 Therein lies the compelling need
to re-examine the issues and infuse hope in addressing urgent human needs.33
“Transsexuals pose a dilemma in the law both in their pre-operative
and post-operative states. . . . Remedying this situation requires far-reaching
changes in social perceptions and understanding[].” 34 The complexities
challenge legal scholars and practitioners to move beyond looking at the
issue through a traditional lens to one that provides a greater view of the
human landscape in everyday expression.35 Our humanness compels us to do
this if all of us are to reach our full potential as human beings. Reaching full
potential inherently means that social equality and justice are infused
throughout the lifespan of every person. In so doing, the legal system should
consider the broader lens to inform.36
“Critics of bipolar categories have called for their restructuring in the
hope[] of creating more inclusive categories that reflect people’s true
identities.” 37 Yet, the very use of categories continues to perpetuate a
hierarchy of power that controls the allocation, or lack thereof, of rights and
privileges.38 In contrast, Labman posits that “far-reaching changes in social
perceptions and understandings” are needed, and further that “[t]he law has
the ability to both mirror and construct social norms.” 39 In essence, sex
becomes a fluid concept which “dissolves and simply [a] relationship[]
remain[s].”40
31.
Id. at 920–21.
32.
Id. at 928.
33.
See id.
34.
Shauna Labman, Left in Legal Limbo: Transsexual Identity and the Law,
7 APPEAL: REV. CURRENT L. & L. REFORM 66, 66 (2001).
35.
See id. at 66–67.
36.
See id. at 67, 72.
37.
Rachel Haynes, Book Note, Bisexual Jurisprudence:
A Tripolar
Approach to Law and Society, 5 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 229, 229 (1999) (reviewing RUTH
COLKER, HYBRID: BISEXUALS, MULTIRACIALS, AND OTHER MISFITS UNDER AMERICAN LAW
(1996)). Others such as Ruth Colker champion the concept of hybrid, which is used to
describe people who lie between bipolar legal categories. Id.
38.
See id. at 231. Colker’s belief was that without categories there would be
anarchy. Id. at 238.
39.
Labman, supra note 34, at 66.
40.
Id. at 72.
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Reconceptualizing the Issues From a Humanistic Point of View

Relationship. It is the central life force that connects us as human
beings. 41 Margaret S. Mahler, a world-renowned child psychoanalyst,
introduced scholars of human behavior to the concept of a second birth.42
That is, the emergence of a “psychological being possessing selfhood and
separate identity.”43 Therein is a journey of navigating life, incorporating
both a sense of oneness or attachment to others as well as sense of self or
who we are as individuals. 44 Beyond the legal arguments regarding the
biology of sex and gender lie more substantial reasons for the need to look at
the importance of relationships as the lynchpin of addressing the issues,
rather than simply creating categories of race, sex, and gender.45 In order to
examine this vast and complex realm of humanness, it is helpful to have a
workable framework that helps one to make sense out of this complexity.46
One effective approach is use of the biopsychosocial model.47 The
biopsychosocial model was introduced in the 1950s by Roy Grinker, a
neurologist and psychiatrist, who coined the term.48 However, this model is
“associated indelibly with the name of George Engel, the internist,
psychiatrist, and psychoanalyst” who “preached the indissoluble nature of
mind-body links.”49 “Engel championed his ideas . . . [in part] to reverse the
dehumanization of medicine and disempowerment of patients.”50 The model
presented the philosophical view that “material lesions, life experiences, and
current social situation[s] all matter in the presentation of illness.” 51 The
elegant, powerful, and versatile nature of this model is such that other
professions—including social work—adopted the framework to address the
41.
See LOUISE J. KAPLAN, ONENESS AND SEPARATENESS: FROM INFANT TO
INDIVIDUAL 16–17 (1978).
42.
Id. at 15–16.
43.
Id. at 15. Mahler’s work remains a cornerstone of child development
theory. See id. at 15, 19. Kaplan was an understudy of Mahler. See id. at 11.
44.
Kaplan, supra note 41, at 16–17.
45.
See Labman, supra note 34, at 66; Haynes, supra note 37, at 230.
46.
See Haynes, supra note 37, at 230.
47.
Edward Shorter, The History of the Biopsychosocial Approach in
Medicine: Before and After Engel in BIOPHYSICAL MEDICINE: AN INTEGRATED APPROACH TO
UNDERSTANDING ILLNESS 1, 1 (Peter White ed., 2005).
48.
S. Nassir Ghaemi, The Rise and Fall of the Biopsychosocial Model, 195
BRIT. J. OF PSYCHIATRY 3, 3 (2009).
49.
Shorter, supra note 47, at 3; see also George L. Engel, The Need for a
New Medical Model: A Challenge for Biomedicine, 196 SCI. 129, 132–33 (1977).
50.
Francesce Borrell-Carrió et al., The Biopsychosocial Model 25 Years
Later: Principles, Practice, and Scientific Inquiry, 2 ANNALS FAM. MED. 576, 576 (2004).
51.
Shorter, supra note 47, at 2.
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complex issues of person-in-environment.52 Social work has a long-standing
history in social reform and social justice, valuing the worth and dignity of
every human being, the importance of human relationships, and
empowerment.53
B.

Attachment: The Essence of Humanness

“Attachment theory is indispensable for understanding” the
biopsychosocial interplay between person and environment. 54 The theory
was developed by psychiatrist John Bowlby through his work with the World
Health Organization concerning health implications of homelessness in
children. 55 He concluded that the crucial element in mental health is
predicated on a “warm, intimate, and continuous relationship with a
caregiver.”56 Human biology fosters this crucial need.57 Paul MacLean, a
pioneer in the study of the human brain, contends that biology of attachment
“goes back 180 million years [ago], originating with the earliest mammals”
and even nesting birds.58 Indeed, we are biologically wired for connection.59
For example, when an infant is in distress, the child emits a particular cry
that brings caregiver protection, safety, and nurturing.60
The biological need for attachment crosses all geography and
cultures. 61 Central to attachment is the need for a consistent and secure
base.62 “The importance of having a secure base cannot be overstated. As
52.
See Tina Maschi & Robert Youdin, SOCIAL WORKER AS RESEARCHER:
INTEGRATING RESEARCH WITH ADVOCACY 3 (2010).
53.
See id. at 11. Social worker Jane Addams, most famously associated with
Hull House in Chicago, won the Nobel Peace Prize in 1931. Id. at 6, 12, 25. Hull House was
an innovative settlement house that was developed in the slums of poor migrant people in the
late 1880s. Id. at 9, 25. Leymah Gbowee—also a social worker, founder, and president of the
Monrovia-based Gbowee Peace Foundation, Africa, Liberia—was selected Nobel Peace Prize
winner in 2011 for her work on behalf of advancing women’s rights, conflict resolution, and
working with ex-soldiers and victims of gender-based violence. See Gender, War &
Peacebuilding Study Guide, U.S. INST. OF PEACE 1, 10, http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/
files/NPECSG12.pdf.
54.
JON G. ALLEN, COPING WITH TRAUMA: A GUIDE TO SELF-UNDERSTANDING
35–36 (1995).
55.
Id. at 36.
56.
Id.
57.
See id. at 36–37.
58.
Id. at 37; see also PAUL D. MACLEAN, THE TRIUNE BRAIN IN EVOLUTION:
ROLE IN PALEOCEREBRAL FUNCTIONS 8–9 (1990); M. Alan Kazlev, The Triune Brain, KHEPER,
http://www.kheper.net/topics/intelligence/MacLean.htm (last modified Oct. 19, 2003).
59.
ALLEN, supra note 54, at 36–37.
60.
Id. at 36.
61.
See id. at 38.
62.
Id. at 37.
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Bowlby says, our survival as a species has depended on it.”63 A secure base
is required in order for a human being to develop both individually and
socially. 64 Without this consistent secure base, infants and children have
tremendous challenges in normal psychological social development. 65 In
fact, attachment is critical to self-regulation, or the ability to manage one’s
physiology.66 Witness the child in distress who runs to mother or proximate
caregiver.67 Recall human reaction to catastrophic events, such as natural
disaster, terrorist attacks, and the like.68 The most compelling need in these
instances is to connect with loved ones, friends, or people who represent
safety. 69
Connection and proximity have a calming effect both
psychologically and physically. 70 Through attachment, comes interaction
with the mother or primary caregiver and others in the social environment.71
This interaction has often been referred to as mirroring.72 Heinz Kohut’s
original studies illuminated this concept.73 If this interaction is positive over
time, then a sense of self or self-cohesion develops. 74 “Over time, these
[positive interactions] lead to the child’s capacity to feel pride and take
pleasure in his or her accomplishments—to feel a sense of competence and
efficacy.” 75 When interaction is inconsistent, violent, rejecting, and
destructive, the sense of self is compromised. 76 As a result, children
“become arrested in their development of an internal sense of confidence and
competence. . . . [H]e mistrusts and disrespects his own internal signals and
states; he doubts his own self-worth and competence.”77
63.
Id.
64.
ALLEN, supra note 54, at 37–38.
65.
Id. at 36, 38.
66.
See id. at 36, 46.
67.
See id. at 46.
68.
See id. at 37, 47.
69.
ALLEN, supra note 54, at 37. In coping with any traumatic event, safety is
critical. Id. at 47. Even inanimate objects can provide a measure of protection and safety. Id.
“This phenomenon of bonding to places [is referred to as] site attachment.” Id.
70.
Id. at 36.
71.
ALLEN, supra note 54, at 36.
72.
David B. Wexler, The Broken Mirror: A Self Psychological Treatment
Perspective for Relationship Violence, 8 J. PSYCHOTHERAPY PRAC. & RES. 129, 130 (1999).
73.
See Jamie McLean, Psychotherapy with a Narcissistic Patient Using
Kohut’s Self Psychology Model, PSYCHIATRY (EDGMONT), Oct. 2007, at 40, 41,
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2860525.
74.
See Wexler, supra note 72, at 130, 137.
75.
Id. at 130.
76.
See id.
77.
Id. Children then often mirror in adulthood the very traits they
experienced from negative interactions in their growing years. See id. “While insisting [the]
men [and women] take full responsibility for their . . . behavior,” Wexler and others have used
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Our need for attachment continues throughout our lifetime. 78
Interestingly, the “methods that enable one human being to enslave another
are remarkably consistent.” 79 A universal method used to control human
beings is the destruction of attachments and isolation.80 “The destruction of
attachments requires not only the isolation of the victim from others, but also
the destruction of her internal images of connection to others.”81 Thus, our
biology of attachment is in play throughout the life span.82 Attachment and
social connection provide a nurturing stream of affirmation and belonging.83
The fact that perpetrators of power universally use isolation as a weapon of
control speaks to our continuing vulnerability as human beings.84 Fostering
attachment and affirmation is the phenomenon of mirroring and witnessing.85
These two interpersonal interactions are essential to the formation of selfidentity and to a sense of one’s place in the family, the community, the
culture, and indeed, the larger social environment.86 Consider the following:
C.

Who Am I? The Personal and Social-Cultural Self

“Western societies, in which most of this theorizing and research has
been carried out, can be characterized as cultural contexts with a strong
emphasis on personal identities and individual achievements.” 87
Contributing to identity development is “a substantial body of research
reporting on phenomena that illustrate the powerful impact of people’s social

self-psychological principles in working with clients who have battered their family members.
Wexler, supra note 72, at 140. Treatment programs such as Domestic Violence 2000 and
Foundations for Violence-Free Living integrate these concepts. Id. That is not to say that all
children experiencing deficient parenting will become abusive or neglectful. See id. at 131.
The journey to positive adulthood is that much more arduous. See id. at 130.
78.
See ALLEN, supra note 54, at 43–44.
79.
JUDITH LEWIS HERMAN, TRAUMA AND RECOVERY: THE AFTERMATH OF
VIOLENCE—FROM DOMESTIC ABUSE TO POLITICAL TERROR 76 (1997). “The accounts of
hostages, political prisoners, and survivors of concentrations camps” as well as survivors of
domestic violence “from every corner of the globe have an uncanny sameness.” Id. at 76–77.
80.
Id. at 77.
81.
Id. at 80. “Inevitably, in the absence of any other point of view, the victim
will come to see the world through the eyes of the perpetrator.” Id. at 81.
82.
See ALLEN, supra note 54, at 43–44.
83.
Id. at 44.
84.
See HERMAN, supra note 79, at 80–81.
85.
Aaron H. Devor, Witnessing and Mirroring: A Fourteen Stage Model of
Transsexual Identity Formation, 8 J. GAY & LESBIAN PSYCHOTHERAPY, no. 1-2, 2004 at 41,
46.
86.
See id. at 46–47.
87.
Naomi Ellemers et al., Self and Social Identity, 53 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL.
161, 162 (2002) (citation omitted).
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identities on their perceptions, emotions, and behavior.”88 Biology—with its
compelling forces for our need of attachment—moves us into the
psychological and social arenas, which are also essential elements of human
development.89 Biology of attachment is but one powerful factor in human
development. 90 In addition to the universal need for attachment, the last
thirty years of research indicate that human beings have “a strong biosocial
preparedness for emotion expression and emotional communication in
infancy.”91 Herein, the phenomena of witnessing and mirroring come into
play.92
1.

Witnessing: Observing and Affirmation

“Witness: [O]bserver . . . watcher . . . provid[ing] or furnish[ing] . . .
confirm[ing], corroborat[ing] . . . behold[ing].”93 The concept of witnessing
flows from both outside—e.g. an eyewitness providing testimony—to being
watched.94 In both directions, powerful forces emerge that shape the self.95
Survivors of domestic violence, oppression, political imprisonment, and
torture “describe being forced to stand by helplessly while witnessing
atrocities committed against people they love.”96 Witnessing can take on a
different hue in the struggle for survival.97 The death camps of the Holocaust
offer such a perspective.98 In the midst of terror, deprivation, and violence—
direct or indirect—the need to have others know of such human experiences
is paramount. 99 Why? “Terror dissolves the self into silence, but its
aftermath . . . . Horror arises and in its presence men and women are seized

88.
Id. at 163.
89.
See ALLEN, supra note 54, at 46, 50.
90.
See Devor, supra note 85, at 42.
91.
György Gergely & John S. Watson, The Social Biofeedback Theory of
Parental Affect-Mirroring: The Development of Emotional Self-Awareness and Self-Control
in Infancy, 77 INT’L J. PSYCHO-ANALYSIS 1181, 1186 (1996). Cross-cultural research
demonstrates that there are universal facial expressions including “anger, fear, sadness,
disgust, and surprise.” Id.
92.
Id. at 1188.
93.
THE AMERICAN CENTURY THESAURUS 511 (1996).
94.
Devor, supra note 85, at 46.
95.
Id.
96.
HERMAN, supra note 79, at 83.
97.
See TERRENCE DES PRES, THE SURVIVOR: AN ANATOMY OF LIFE IN THE
DEATH CAMPS 32–33 (1976).
98.
See id.
99.
See id. at 33.
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by an involuntary outburst of feeling which is very much like a scream . . . .
And in this crude cry the will to bear witness is born . . . .”100
Yet another view incorporates witnessing as essential to a sense of
101
self.
“The effectiveness of witnesses, in part, derives from the fact that
they are not like oneself and can look at us from outside of our categories of
self-definition.” 102 Devor argues that when another person provides
“appraisals which conform to one’s own sense of self, it leaves one with a
feeling of having been accurately seen by others who can be assumed to be
impartial.”103 Devor believes that this is a critical issue for people who are
transsexual.104 In all of these instances, the threading element is the presence
of, or being present with, other human beings.105
2.

Mirroring: Reflection of Self-Identity

Mirror: Reflection, reproduction, representation;106 the concept of
mirroring is an inextricable facet of human development.107 The validation
and affirmation of human expression in infancy enables the developing child
to develop a sense of cohesion within the self and self-expression.108 In the
process of attachment and calming, affirming the presence of others’ regard
for, and sacredness of one’s humanness and that of others is manifested.109
Mirroring may also be regarded as “seeing oneself in the eyes of others like
oneself.”110 From a psychosocial perspective, infants are sensitive to face-toface affective communication and “are, to a large extent, dependent on their
parent’s affect-regulative interactions as a means of emotional self-

100.
Id. at 33. The compelling desire for those in a life and death struggle is to
bear witness. Id. To tell the world. DES PRES, supra note 97, at 33. Des Pres accounts that
[i]t took months and months of preparation, cutting down the suicides, insisting that
survival even in such a place is not without value. Their purpose—strong enough
to lift the spirit from truly inhuman depths—was to destroy the camp and allow at
least one man or woman to escape and bear the tale.

Id. at 32–33.
101.
Devor, supra note 85, at 46.
102.
Id. Devor makes the distinction between witnessing and mirroring. Id.
The former is critical in that the “[w]itness[] can be presumed to have some distance and
therefore . . . objectivity.” Id. at 46. That is, validation is from someone not like oneself. Id.
103.
Devor, supra note 85, at 46.
104.
See id.
105.
See id. at 46–47.
106.
THE AMERICAN CENTURY THESAURUS, supra note 93, at 253.
107.
See Devor, supra note 85, at 46; Gergely & Watson, supra note 91, at
1186–88.
108.
See Gergely & Watson, supra note 91, at 1186–88.
109.
Id. at 1188.
110.
Devor, supra note 85, at 46.
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regulation.”111 Thus, requisite to human development over the life span is a
continual need of attachment or sense of belonging, the influence of
significant others in providing feedback and affirmation, and the presence of
a safe supportive environment in which to grow in self-understanding and
expression.112 “Each of us are social beings and as such we live in a sea of
other humans with whom we interact during most of the waking hours of our
lives.”113
These concepts are powerfully illustrated in the lives of people who
are transgender, gay, lesbian, bisexual, and intersex.114 There is, inherently,
an immense role that society and the legal system plays in the struggle for
their survival, struggle to be oneself, and have a valued place in the human
sea.115
3.

Identity Formation

“Although societal awareness of the existence of lesbian and gay
people has increased dramatically over the past decade or so, most lesbians
and gay men still grow up within a context of pervasive environmental and
internalized homophobia and expectation to be heterosexual.”116 Likewise,
while biological considerations are significant, “all people live within social
environments which give meanings to the realities of their bodies and
psyches,” 117 including people who are transgender and intersex. 118
Interestingly, the study of identity remains primarily of interest to those most
affected by discrimination and oppression and “little interest to members of
the dominant group.”119 While there are different issues regarding ethnicity
and racial identity with those of differing sexual orientation and gender
expression, there is nonetheless agreement that one’s identity is critical to
psychological functioning as an individual and a person-in-environment.120

111.
Gergely & Watson, supra note 91, at 1188.
112.
See ALLEN, supra note 54, at 36–38, 43; Devor, supra note 85, at 46;
Gergely & Watson, supra note 91, at 1188–89.
113.
Devor, supra note 85, at 46.
114.
See id.; Susan R. McCarn & Ruth E. Fassinger, Revisioning Sexual
Minority Identity Formation: A New Model of Lesbian Identity and Its Implications for
Counseling and Research, 24 COUNSELING PSYCHOL. 508, 508 (1996).
115.
See Devor, supra note 85, at 46–47.
116.
McCarn & Fassinger, supra note 114, at 508.
117.
Devor, supra note 85, at 42.
118.
Id. at 42, 47.
119.
Jean S. Phinney, Ethnic Identity in Adolescents and Adults: Review of
Research, 108 PSYCHOL. BULL. 499, 499 (1990).
120.
Id.
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It is not within the scope of this article to compare and contrast all of
the various models of identity development.121 Each person is special and
unique, as is one’s life journey and circumstance. Thus, no one model can
apply to all individuals in the same manner. However, there is some
consistency in using a stage model to explain a highly complex process.122
Frequently referenced among models of identity development was the stage
model developed by Vivienne C. Cass in 1979. 123 The model has been
revised and conceptually reworked by various researchers throughout the
years. 124 In reviewing the history of sexual minority identity formation,
McCarn and Fassinger postulate that Coleman included another dimension
that focused on the “force of social pressure at different stages of the coming
out process.”125 Further, according to McCarn and Fassinger, the concept of
identity development was again modified by Troiden, who “noted the critical
importance of a supportive lesbian [or] gay environment in facilitating selfdefinition and self-acceptance within the context of social stigma.”126 Devor
proposes a fourteen-stage model of transsexual identity formation in order to
more faithfully address needs and processes of transsexed people. 127
However, there are limitations with all of these models and research studies
attempting to understand the very complex and myriad process of comingout. 128 “More research is needed for inclusion of racially, ethnically,
culturally, and economically diverse samples.”129

121.
See id. at 501–03.
122.
See, e.g., Vivienne C. Cass, Homosexual Identity Formation: A
Theoretical Model, 4 J. HOMOSEXUALITY 219, 235 (1979).
123.
See id. at 219–20. Cass intended the model to apply to both men and
women. Id. at 220. The model includes such dimensions as one’s cognitions—thoughts and
beliefs—and affective and behavioral features into a six-stage process. Id. at 221. Stage one
features identity confusion and questioning. Id. at 222. This stage may be accompanied by
anxiety and discomfort. See Cass, supra note 122, at 223. Other stages include identity
comparison, which often evokes feelings of isolation and alienation. Id. at 225. Final stages
include acceptance of oneself and eventually pride. Id. at 231, 233.
124.
Id. at 219–21; Eli Coleman, Developmental Stages of the Coming Out
Process, in HOMOSEXUALITY & PSYCHOTHERAPY 1982, at 31, 31 (7 J. HOMOSEXUALITY, No. 3,
1982).
125.
McCarn & Fassinger, supra note 114, at 510; see also Coleman, supra
note 124, at 31.
126.
McCarn & Fassinger, supra note 114, at 510; see also Richard R. Troiden,
The Formation of Homosexual Identities, 17 J. HOMOSEXUALITY 43, 48–49 (1989).
127.
Devor, supra note 85, at 42.
128.
See Chad M. Mosher, The Social Implications of Sexual Identity
Formation and the Coming-Out Process: A Review of the Theoretical and Empirical
Literature, 9 FAM. J. 164, 172 (2001).
129.
Id.
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C.
Intersectionality: Human Beings, the Struggle for Self, Society, and
the Legal System
An emerging concept in the study of human behavior, particularly
from a perspective of social justice, is that of intersectionality, which
“underscores the complex nature of cultural and personal identities and
human experiences that cannot be [divided] simply by one dimension of
inequality or difference—either race or gender or sexual orientation or
ability.”130 The sense of identity—who one is and one’s place with other
human beings—is a central theme among scholars of race, ethnicity, sexual
orientation and gender, and gender expression.131 It is the driving force of
human expression to be authentically oneself.132 If the struggle to become
the authentic self takes place in a social environment that is fraught with
messages and practices of oppression, destruction, and life threats, then the
consequences to countless human beings is devastating.133 Such conditions
are much like the forces prisoners of domestic violence and war
experience. 134 To be sure, such forces are often invisible, yet just as
damaging to self and life.135
It is at this intersection of person-and-environment that courts must
emerge as vigilantes and protectors of human life and expression. 136 As
Labman so aptly observed, “[t]he law has the ability to both mirror and
construct social norms.”137 When society is inhumane and oppressive, the
courts must move from a place of continuing to reflect on oppression to a
place of constructing social norms such that all human beings may become
their authentic selves. The need for belonging, for attachment to meaningful
human relationships without terror or fear of annihilation, the creating of safe
and affirming environments, and regarding of the sanctity of our humanness
should be the mission of the legal system.
IV.

SUMMARY

“Contemporary adolescents are coming of age in a world that is
considerably more multicultural than the world in which their parents and
130.
YVETTE MURPHY ET AL., INCORPORATING INTERSECTIONALITY IN SOCIAL
WORK PRACTICE, RESEARCH, POLICY, AND EDUCATION 42 (2009).
131.
See Mosher, supra note 128, at 164; Phinney, supra note 119, at 499.
132.
See ALLEN, supra note 54, at 128.
133.
See id. at 137–42; Phinney, supra note 119, at 499, 511.
134.
See ALLEN, supra note 54, at 137–42; HERMAN, supra note 79, at 51–52.
135.
See ALLEN, supra note 54, at 127–28, 137–42.
136.
See Labman, supra note 34, at 66.
137.
Id.
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grandparents grew up.” 138 The presence of the Internet and global
communication has sped up globalization at an unprecedented pace.139 For
the youth of today, developing a cultural identity is much more inclusive and
complex.140 As a consequence, growing up is at a time of more pronounced
openness and diversity.141 This is no less true for people who are exploring
or experiencing an identity that is fluid and affirming of the authentic self.
To categorize or to make distinctions is to impose a hierarchy of power and
perpetuate oppression. Whether binary or a range of categories—no matter
how humane—the intension is in and of itself creating barriers to the flow of
human development. The world is moving and changing at a speed unlike
any other in time. There is a moral imperative for the courts to respond to
the inevitable growing flexibility and fluidity of human expression and
authenticity.
V.

PERSONAL STORIES: SERAFIMA METZ AND KRYSTA CASCIO

In order to avoid talking about people who deserve legal recognition
in the abstract, their stories will be told. Since self-identity is key to finding
out how society and the law in particular treat any person, the first portion of
this Part will examine how each person self-identified.142 These stories are a
product of reaching out to the transsexual community and asking for
volunteers to tell their stories. 143 Those transcripts and recordings will
become part of a project at Shepard Broad Law Center to archive stories of
the Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transsexual, Intersex (“LGBTI”) community
entitled: The Harris L. Kimball Memorial Digital Archive of Lesbian, Gay,
Bisexual, Transgender, and Queer Florida Legal Oral History.144

138.
Lene Arnett Jensen, Coming of Age in a Multicultural World:
Globalization and Adolescent Cultural Identity Formation, 7 APPLIED DEVELOPMENTAL SCI.
189, 189 (2003), http://www.lenearnettjensen.com/files/2012/05/2003-ADS-Jensen-Comingof-Age-Multicultural-World.pdf.
139.
Id.
140.
Id.
141.
Id. at 191.
142.
See infra Part V.A–B.
143.
See Interview with Krysta Cascio, in Fort Lauderdale, Fla., 1 (Apr. 8,
2013) (on file with Nova Southeastern University, Shepard Broad Law Center Library);
Interview with Serafima Metz, in Fort Lauderdale, Fla., 1 (Apr. 1, 2013) (on file with Nova
Southeastern University, Shepard Broad Law Center Library).
144.
See Interview with Krysta Cascio, supra note 143, at 1; Interview with
Serafima Metz, supra note 143, at 1.
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Identity

Serafima Metz said that even though she was born a male, that over
the process of both mental and physical development, she now considers
herself female.145 She found it problematic when it came to the law because
she has observed that while she considers herself a female, the law might
come to a different opinion.146 Serafima was quite willing to accept labels
when it came to identity. 147 She observed that when labeled as
transgendered, she embraced it.148
Krysta Cascio had a different approach.149 First, she said she did not
like labels. 150 However, when pressed, she now considers herself as a
“pansexual, intersex, post-op trans-woman.” 151 Interestingly, Krysta also
said that she liked the definition of pansexual, which she understands as
meaning gender blind.152 She noted that pansexual is different from being
bi-sexual, which means you are equally attracted to men and women.153 But,
bi-sexual leaves out, according to Krysta, all the trans-men, trans-women,
and those who considered themselves two-spirited. 154 Thus, according to
Krysta, gender is not binary.155 Rather she sees it as a “huge scale of gray,
and . . . you can fall in love with anyone on that scale of gray.”156 Krysta
adds that she is blind to race, religion or disability.157 “[I]f I meet somebody
and I connect with them and we click and then [that is] all that should matter.
The rest is irrelevant.”158

145.
Interview with Serafima Metz, supra note 143, at 1; see also GRANT ET
supra note 20, at 24. The National Transgender Discrimination Survey has extensive
information about transgendered people. GRANT ET AL., supra note 20, at 20–32.
146.
Interview with Serafima Metz, supra note 143, at 1.
147.
Id.
148.
Id.
Seventy-five percent of respondents identified themselves as
transgendered. GRANT ET AL., supra note 20, at 24. Interesting that forty-seven percent of that
number identified as MTF, while only twenty-eight percent identified as FTM. Id.
149.
See Interview with Krysta Cascio, supra note 143, at 1.
150.
Id.
151.
Id.
152.
Id. at 16.
153.
Id.
154.
Interview with Krysta Cascio, supra note 143, at 16. “Gender identity and
expression are complex and layered characteristics, with almost as many variations as there
are individuals.” GRANT ET AL., supra note 20, at 24.
155.
Interview with Krysta Cascio, supra note 143, at 16.
156.
Id. Of those surveyed, fourteen percent identified themselves as gender
non-conforming. GRANT ET AL., supra note 20, at 24.
157.
Interview with Krysta Cascio, supra note 143, at 16.
158.
Id.
AL.,
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Growing Up

Serafima’s redefined identity began at an early age.159 According to
her, when she was “very young [she did not] fit in with the rest of the males”
when she was at school. 160 The other boys teased her constantly.161 She
considered herself different.162 She really had no role models and it was not
until she was nineteen years old that she even met another transgendered
person.163 At that time, she realized that “it was actually quite acceptable
thing to do at . . . my own moral code.”164 She knew she had the genitalia of
a boy, but her identity was nebulous.165 While she felt contrary to her body,
she was happy with her life being a woman.166
Krysta had some of the same experiences.167 When she was about
four or five years old she said she recalls not falling into the gender
binary.168 She remembers dressing up as Wonder Woman every day.169 She
would come home and watch Linda Carter spin around and become Wonder
Woman.170 So, Krysta would spin around hoping that she would become a
woman.171
Krysta’s growing up phase differed from Serafima’s.172 First, Krysta
went to a Christian school that only had six students in class.173 Since the
class was so small, the students really did not divide into gender specific
roles.174 For instance, to play football, they all joined in.175 It was not until
she started going through puberty that she realized something was not quite
right.176 While she devoted her spare time to science fiction, reading comic
159.
Interview with Serafima Metz, supra note 143, at 1.
160.
Id.
161.
Id. at 2. Seventy-eight percent reported harassment, thirty-five percent
physical assault, and twelve percent sexual violence when in grades kindergarten through
twelfth. GRANT ET AL., supra note 20, at 3. Unfortunately, teachers were not very helpful
and, in fact, thirty-one percent said that teachers and staff also harassed them. Id. at 33.
162.
Interview with Serafima Metz, supra note 143, at 2.
163.
Id. at 1.
164.
Id.
165.
Id. at 1–2.
166.
Id. at 2.
167.
See Interview with Krysta Cascio, supra note 143, at 1.
168.
Id.
169.
Id.
170.
Id.
171.
Id.
172.
Compare Interview with Krysta Cascio, supra note 143, at 1, with
Interview with Serafima Metz, supra note 143, at 2.
173.
Interview with Krysta Cascio, supra note 143, at 1.
174.
Id.
175.
Id.
176.
Id.
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books, and becoming a gaming geek, she suddenly also developed breasts.177
She thought she was a mutant.178 She hid the factor, never revealing it to
anybody.179 She made sure she did not do anything that would show that she
had breasts.180 This meant she stopped swimming and wore heavy jackets to
school. 181 Given that she lived in Miami, she was the target of ridicule
because of her apparel. 182 She described herself as an outcast. 183 Even
though she was an outcast, she had both girlfriends and boyfriends.184 She
had no name for her orientation.185
When Serafima was in high school, she began wearing women’s
clothing now and then.186 Her take on it was that punk shows were popular
at the time, so she was just following that style.187 In fact, she went to many
punk shows and always wore dresses, and it made her feel good. 188
Additionally, Serafima had a very supporting family.189 While she found it
difficult to fully come out to them, she felt they were enlightened and liberal
and “really put the effort to try and understand” what she was confiding in
them.190 Regardless of their support, Serafima attempted suicide when she
was eighteen. 191 Her parents encouraged her to go to a treatment center
because she was suffering from major depression.192 When she got out, she
went back to the university she was attending, but again, she was so
depressed, she tried to commit suicide again.193 As a result, she went to
another treatment center, which was a three-month program for patients who
177.
Id.
178.
Interview with Krysta Cascio, supra note 143, at 1.
179.
Id.
180.
Id. at 1–2.
181.
Id. at 2.
182.
Id.
183.
Interview with Krysta Cascio, supra note 143, at 2.
184.
Id.
185.
Id.
186.
Interview with Serafima Metz, supra note 143, at 3.
187.
Id.
188.
Id.
189.
Id.
190.
Id.
191.
Email from Charlene Smith, Law Professor, Nova Southeastern Univ., to
Krysta Cascio (Apr. 12, 2013) (on file with Charlene Smith); see also Debra Cassens Weiss,
Report: ‘Staggering’ Rate of Attempted Suicides by Transgenders Highlights Injustices, ABA
J. (Feb. 4, 2011, 2:29 PM), http://www.abajournal.com/mobile/article/staggering_rate_
of_attempted_suicides_by_transgenders_highlights_injustices. Forty-one percent of those
who responded to a survey said they had attempted suicide in comparison to a 1.6% of the
general population. Weiss, supra note 191.
192.
Email from Charlene Smith, Law Professor, Nova Southeastern Univ., to
Krysta Cascio, supra note 191.
193.
Id.
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had been diagnosed with mental illness.194 She was also there for substance
abuse.195 After she got out, she lived with her parents for a short amount of
time and eventually went to live in a house that was established for queer and
trans people.196 It was the first time she had ever interacted with trans or
queer people.197 As Serafima put it, “I began to feel comfortable questioning
and exploring my gender identity.” 198 She started her transition with
hormones, and as her body started changing, she began wearing women’s
clothing all the time.199
C.

Relationships

Serafima considers herself a lesbian and is in a committed
relationship with another woman. 200 She rejects the idea that she is bisexual.201 She said she was always attracted to women and that has remained
the same throughout her life.202
Krysta noted that relationships are tough for trans folks. 203 If
somebody was with a person before the transition, it’s rough. 204 For
instance, Krysta knew a couple that had been together for fifteen years but,
right after the surgery, the wife left.205 The hormonal treatment is also a
factor. 206 Because the person seeking to become the opposite gender has
many emotional changes, the partner cannot handle the ups and downs.207
Then, after the change is completed, finding a partner who is understanding
is almost impossible.208 According to Krysta, when you are trying to find
someone, you go stealth, and it becomes very awkward to tell the new
person.209 Additionally, the newly trans person tends to fall for the wrong
person.210
194.
Id.
195.
Id.
196.
Id.
197.
Email from Charlene Smith, Law Professor, Nova Southeastern Univ., to
Krysta Cascio, supra note 191.
198.
Id.
199.
Interview with Serafima Metz, supra note 143, at 3–4.
200.
Id. at 4.
201.
Id.
202.
Id.
203.
Interview with Krysta Cascio, supra note 143, at 18.
204.
Id.
205.
Id. at 19.
206.
Id.
207.
See id.
208.
Interview with Krysta Cascio, supra note 143, at 19.
209.
Id.
210.
Id.
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Legal and Societal Difficulties

Before getting her name changed, Serafima applied to the university
where she is currently a student.211 To get the university to change her first
name was an uphill struggle.212 Her problem was that she would be on the
teacher’s roster with a male name.213 She encountered a massive amount of
bureaucracy to get her name on all the university’s collection of her data
corrected. 214 However, while the university changed her name, they still
have her listed as a male.215 She was able to change her driver’s license by
getting a letter from her doctor.216 However, that was a very difficult task.217
Serafima found very little information on how to go about this process.218
The people who work at the Department of Motor Vehicles were not
helpful.219 Her experience with Social Security was even more stressful.220
They eventually informed her that until her birth certificate was changed,
they would not change the name on her Social Security card.221 Naturally,
that has made getting jobs very difficult for Serafima.222 If it were not for
True Group, 223 she would not have known the steps to take. 224 They
provided all the forms she needed.225 The process was not cheap; it cost
Serafima over four hundred dollars in court costs to complete as many
documents as she had. 226 She estimates that it takes about three to four
months to complete the process, because many of the items required her to
appear in court.227

211.
212.
213.
214.

Interview with Serafima Metz, supra note 143, at 5.
See id.
Id.
Id. She notes that the university is huge, so that might explain some part

of it. Id.
215.
Interview with Serafima Metz, supra note 143, at 5.
216.
Id.
217.
See id.
218.
Id.
219.
See id.
220.
See Interview with Serafima Metz, supra note 143, at 5–6.
221.
Id.
222.
Id. at 6.
223.
This Miami based group provides information on their website on how to
go about changing your name/gender on legal documents.
224.
Interview with Serafima Metz, supra note 143, at 6; Legal Name &
Gender Marker Change, supra note 223.
225.
Interview with Serafima Metz, supra note 143, at 6–7; Legal Name &
Gender Marker Change, supra note 223.
226.
Interview with Serafima Metz, supra note 143, at 7.
227.
Id.

Published by NSUWorks, 2017

21

Nova Law Review, Vol. 39, Iss. 2 [2017], Art. 1

138

NOVA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 39

Krysta’s experience regarding the law mirrors much of what
Serafima explained.228 For instance, she said she spent a “whole day waiting
at the wrong courthouse.” 229 This happened because when she searched
online, it gave the information that she could go to any courthouse within the
county.230 She said that she mostly ran in circles because she did not have a
clue as to what to do. 231 Anybody she asked who had been through the
experience had outdated information. 232 “[T]he name change alone was
seven months of legal crap and fighting.”233 The whole process is different
in every county.234 Krysta thoughtfully documented her experience, and then
put up a website to help others.235
Further, Krysta’s situation was different from other trans.236 Because
she had Crohn’s disease, it was more complicated.237 For instance, because
she needs Medicare assistance, Medicare gets information from Social
Security, which gets its information from her birth certificate.238 She needed
to change her gender on official documents—including her birth certificate—
because when she went to the pharmacy to get her medicine, if they did not
see the correct gender, they would not give her the medicine she needed.239
That differs from many trans folks because if they get their driver’s license
changed, then a private insurer will accept that as being the proof they need
for gender identification. 240 Unfortunately, in Florida, you must have the
surgery before you can change your birth certificate.241
VI.

THE LAW AND HOW TRANS RIGHTS ARE LARGELY IGNORED

There are many rights and privileges afforded to U.S. citizens who
fit into the legal dichotomy of either male or female. 242 Individuals who
identify with the biological sex he or she was born into, take for granted
certain rights and protections. Unfortunately, the law creates distinct
228.
See Interview with Krysta Cascio, supra note 143, at 8–9; Interview with
Serafima Metz, supra note 143 at 5–7.
229.
Interview with Krysta Cascio, supra note 143, at 8.
230.
Id.
231.
Id.
232.
See id.
233.
Id. at 7.
234.
Interview with Krysta Cascio, supra note 143, at 7.
235.
Id.
236.
See id. at 3–5.
237.
See id.
238.
Id. at 8–9.
239.
Interview with Krysta Cascio, supra note 143, at 8–9.
240.
Id.
241.
Id. at 9.
242.
See infra Part VII.
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categories of male and female, rendering individuals who do not fit into this
binary sex classification outside the scope of certain laws.243
The narrow binary sex classification system fails to take into
consideration the difference between sex and gender.244 The language and
scope of the law makes the unfortunate and detrimental assumption that the
biological sex a person is born with will match the gender they identify
with. 245 There is a compelling need to reshape the law to incorporate
individuals whose sex does not match their gender, because for trans people
it is not as simple as penis equals male, and vagina equals female.246 The
trans community faces a great battle in their fight to gain equality and
reshape the law to address the human rights and privileges currently denied
to them.247
America is not always at the forefront of human rights, and is
actually lagging behind other countries with respect to reaching equality for
transgender people. Laws and policies followed in other countries would
eliminate many of the issues discussed in this article. 248 For example,
Argentina recently passed a gender-identity law, which enables people to
change their name and sex on official documents without judicial or medical
approval. 249 The Netherlands has also taken an illustrative step toward
equality by removing the surgery requirement to changing the gender marker
on official documents.250 As this Article illustrates, America still has a long
way to go in achieving equality and providing human rights to every person,
irrespective of sexual orientation or gender identity.
243.
See infra Part VII. As Serafima Metz recognized, even though she
personally identifies as a female, the law will not necessarily agree. Interview with Serafima
Metz, supra note 143, at 1; see also supra Part V.A. Krysta Cascio also disagrees with the
binary sex classification of the law, rejecting the black and white view of gender, believing
instead in a huge scale of gray. Interview with Krysta Cascio, supra note 143, at 16; see also
supra Part V.A.
244.
See supra Part III.
245.
See infra Part VII.
246.
See infra Part VII. Serafima and Krysta were both born male, but from a
very young age knew that the biological sex they were born into did not fit with the gender
they identified with. Interview with Krysta Cascio, supra note 143, at 1–2; Interview with
Serafima Metz, supra note 143, at 1–2.
247.
See Jessica Sideways, The Unique Issues that Transexuals Face,
HUBPAGES,
http://jessicasideways.hubpages.com/hub/The-Unique-Issues-that-TransexualsFace (last updated Feb. 9, 2014).
248.
See The Netherlands: Victory for Transgender Rights, HUMAN RIGHTS
WATCH (Dec. 19, 2013), http://www.hrw.org/news/2013/12/19/netherlands-victorytransgender-rights; Michael Warren, Argentina’s Gender ID Law Takes Effect, HUFFINGTON
POST (June 5, 2012, 11:24 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/06/05/argentinagender-identity-law-takes-effect_n_1570830.html.
249.
Warren, supra note 248.
250.
The Netherlands: Victory for Transgender Rights, supra note 248.
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Within the lesbian, gay, and bisexual (“LGB”) community, the fight
to eliminate sexual orientation discrimination in areas such as marriage,
raising children, and employment is ongoing and slowly moving in a positive
direction.251 However, gender identity and sexual orientation are different,
and the binary approach to the law creates even bigger hurdles for trans
people in reaching equality.252 The myriad of issues faced by trans people
begins with their legal identity, and includes much of the discrimination
experienced by the LGB community. 253 Thus, although LGBT is often
grouped together, the trans community faces legal issues distinct from LGBs,
relating to gender identity rather than sexual orientation.254
This portion of the Article focuses on some of the major issues faced
by transsexuals resulting from the law’s categorical approach of defining
sex.255 These topics include: States’ varying approaches for defining legal
sex, processes of amending birth certificates and driver’s licenses,
protections provided by state and federal anti-discrimination statutes, access
to healthcare, the right to marry, and the right to raise children.256
VII.

LEGAL IDENTITY

The protections, rights, and benefits denied to the transgender
community stem from the lack of recognition of their self-identified name
and sex.257 Trans people face legal obstacles at all stages and facets of their
life and “the ability to live fully in their post-transition name and sex can be
vitally important to their safety, gender transition, and family security.”258
As discussed in this Article, the legal identity of a transsexual affects the
protections afforded to them under state and federal anti-discrimination
statutes, the right to marry, and the right to raise children, to name just a
few.259 Further, the basic need of a trans person’s recognition of the legal
sex he or she identifies with is essential to his or her access to appropriate

251.
See Sideways, supra note 247.
252.
See The Netherlands: Victory for Transgender Rights, supra note 248.
253.
Sideways, supra note 247; see also The Netherlands: Victory for
Transgender Rights, supra note 248.
254.
See Sideways, supra note 247.
255.
See infra Parts VII–X.
256.
Id.
257.
Janson Wu & Kylar W. Broadus, Recognition of Name and Sex, in
TRANSGENDER FAMILY LAW: A GUIDE TO EFFECTIVE ADVOCACY 16, 16 (Jennifer L. Levi &
Elizabeth E. Monnin-Browder eds., 2012).
258.
Id.
259.
See infra Parts VII–X.
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public accommodations, such as prisons, shelters, and restrooms.260 The first
step in achieving equality is to legally recognize a transsexual’s gender
identity by providing simple legal mechanisms under which a transsexual
may change his or her name, amend his or her birth certificate, driver’s
license, and any other official documents.261
A.

How the States Define Legal Sex

An individual’s sex is defined by his or her physical attributes,
including sexual and reproductive anatomy, hormones, and chromosomes, as
well as his or her gender identity, which is the individual’s actual or
perceived gender.262 Generally, a person’s biological sex and gender identity
“line up, making the shorthand use of one’s birth genitalia to identify sex
unproblematic. Particularly for transsexual and intersexed persons, gender
identity and the physical characteristics of sex in some way[s] conflict.”263
When there is a conflict, the states vary on the approach taken in determining
the legal sex of a transgendered person.264 Unfortunately, most jurisdictions
take the essentialist approach and define sex as immutable and fixed at

260.
See D. MORGAN BASSICHIS, SYLVIA RIVERA LAW PROJECT, “IT’S WAR IN
HERE”: A REPORT ON THE TREATMENT OF TRANSGENDER AND INTERSEX PEOPLE IN NEW YORK
STATE MEN’S PRISONS 12 (Dean Spade ed., 2007).
261.
The Netherlands: Victory for Transgender Rights, supra note 248; see
also Warren, supra note 248. This can be achieved by following the approach taken by
countries like Argentina, which allow transgender people to change their names and amend
official documents without having to go through painful and intensive surgery or obtaining
judicial approval. The Netherlands: Victory for Transgender Rights, supra note 248.
Serafima’s experience provides an example of the complicated and expensive process that
transsexuals go through when attempting to amend official documents. See supra Part V. She
was unable to change her driver’s license without a letter from her doctor, and Social Security
would not change her Social Security card until her birth certificate was changed. See supra
Part V.D. After about three to four months, and over four hundred dollars in court costs and
multiple court appearances, she was able to amend her birth certificate and obtain congruent
documents. See supra Part V.D.
262.
See Taylor Flynn, The Ties That (Don’t) Bind: Transgender Family Law
and the Unmaking of Families, in TRANSGENDER RIGHTS 32, 34 (Paisley Currah et al. eds.,
2006).
263.
Id. (alteration in original). Intersexed individuals are born with “a
reproductive or sexual anatomy that [does not] seem to fit the typical definitions of female or
male. For example, a person might be born appearing to be female on the outside, but having
mostly male-typical anatomy on the inside.” What Is Intersex?, INTERSEX SOC’Y OF N. AM.,
http://www.isna.org/faq/what_is_intersex (last visited Aug. 25, 2015).
264.
Compare Littleton v. Prange, 9 S.W.3d 223, 231 (Tex. App. 1999)
(finding sex to be immutable and fixed at birth), with M.T. v. J.T., 355 A.2d 204, 209 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1976) (finding gender identity essential in determining legal sex of a
transsexual).
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birth. 265 A minority of jurisdictions have found gender identity to be
determinative, or at least an essential factor, to defining legal sex.266 The
gender identity approach to defining legal sex is urged because, if followed
by all states, it would not only provide consistency to the law, but also would
reflect the current medical and psychological understanding of sex, and most
importantly, would respect an individual’s autonomy.267
As a normative matter, this framework of autonomy-preserving
guarantees—including the rights to privacy, freedom of
expression, and bodily integrity—creates constitutional space for
an as-of-yet-unarticulated right, the right to self-determination of
sexual identity. . . . Such an approach would attempt not only to
reclaim a rights-protecting view of the Constitution but also
envisions a world free of our current investment in policing a
boundary between—or among—the sexes.268

1.

The Biological Test to Defining Legal Sex

Unfortunately, a majority of states, such as Ohio, Texas, and Florida,
follow the approach that sex is immutable and fixed at birth.269 These states
use a rigid biological test to define legal sex, refusing to depart from the
narrow black and white view of sex and gender.270 For instance, in Ohio, the
court refused to issue an order finding a post-operative MTF transsexual to
be female for legal purposes. 271 The court found that a person’s sex is
determined at birth and denied the transsexual’s request to amend her birth
certificate.272 The holding rested solely on biological characteristics stating
that “[t]here was no evidence that [the] applicant at birth had any physical
characteristics other than those of a male and he was thus correctly
designated Boy on his birth certificate. There also was no laboratory
documentation that the applicant had other than male chromosomes.”273

265.
Littleton, 9 S.W.3d at 231; see also Corbett v. Corbett, [1971] P. 83 at 104
(Eng.); Flynn, supra note 262, at 33.
266.
M.T., 355 A.2d at 209.
267.
See Flynn, supra note 262, at 33–35.
268.
Id. at 34.
269.
See Paisley Currah, Gender Pluralisms Under the Transgender Umbrella,
in TRANSGENDER RIGHTS 3, 17 (Paisley Currah et al. eds., 2006).
270.
See In re Declaratory Relief for Ladrach, 513 N.E.2d 828, 832 (Ohio
Prob. Ct. 1987).
271.
Id.
272.
Id. at 832.
273.
Id.
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Further, in Littleton v. Prange,274 the legal question addressed by the
Court of Appeals of Texas was: “[C]an a physician change the gender of a
person with a scalpel, drugs, and counseling, or is a person’s gender
immutably fixed by our Creator at birth?”275 The litigant was born male but
identified as female from the time she was three or four years old.276 After
receiving the appropriate treatments and undergoing complete sex
reassignment surgery (“SRS”), she became a true MTF transsexual.277 In
reaching its conclusion on her legal sex, the court focused solely on the
biological and sexual reproductive organs of the transsexual litigant.278 The
court held Christie to be a male, stating that even though “[s]ome physicians
would consider Christie [to be] female; . . . [h]er female anatomy . . . is all
man made. The body that Christie inhabits is a male body in all aspects
other than what the physicians have supplied.”279
2.

Dual Test of Anatomy & Gender

The legal system, as well as society, needs to recognize that the
question of whether someone is a male or a female is not as simple as
whether that person has a pair of XX or XY chromosomes and the genitalia
he or she was born with.280 The Superior Court of New Jersey understands
this critical realization and the essential role of gender identity in
determining sex.281 Unlike the essentialist approach, the Superior Court of
New Jersey recognized the complexities of sex and took into consideration
factors other than mere biology.282 The court determined that a MTF postoperative transsexual was considered to be legally female. 283 Despite
recognition of jurisdictions following the essentialist approach to sex, this
court found that:
The evidence and authority which we have examined . . . show[s]
that a person’s sex or sexuality embraces an individual’s gender,
that is, one’s self-image, the deep psychological or emotional
sense of sexual identity and character. Indeed, it has been

274.
275.
276.
277.
278.
279.
280.
281.
282.
283.
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9 S.W.3d 223 (Tex. App. 1999).
Id. at 224.
Id.
Id. at 225.
See id. at 230–31.
Littleton, 9 S.W.3d at 231.
Id. at 233 (Lopez, J., dissenting).
See M.T. v. J.T., 355 A.2d 204, 209 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1976).
See id.; Flynn, supra note 262, at 33.
M.T., 355 A.2d at 211.
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observed that the psychological sex of an individual, while not
serviceable for all purposes, is practical, realistic, and humane.284

Although the decision in M.T. v. J.T.285 was favorable and the court’s
recognition of the importance of gender identify is noteworthy, the court
engaged in a body-parts checklist approach.286 The reasoning of the court
contained a detailed discussion of the expert testimony of a doctor pertaining
to J.T.’s post-operative genitalia including its cosmetic appearance, whether
it “could function as any female vagina,” and also whether she is capable of
“traditional penile/vaginal intercourse.”287 This hypersexualization of a trans
person’s post-operative sexual anatomy falls short of the approach that
should govern defining legal sex—that of gender identity.288 While it is true
that the New Jersey court found gender identity significant, the court’s
conclusion reveals an unnecessary emphasis of sexual anatomy focused on
finding that the “transsexual’s gender and genitalia are no longer discordant;
they have been harmonized through medical treatment.”289
B.

Legal Name Changes

Often the first step that a transsexual takes in obtaining legal
recognition of his or her true self is a legal name change because “a name
change sends an important message to the world, a message solidified and
made official with a court’s approval.”290 All states have statutes addressing
the process for changing a person’s name, with varying procedural
requirements.291 Some states also allow common law changes, which take
effect by simply using the new name.292 Almost all state statutes governing
legal name change contain requirements designed to prevent an individual
from changing his or her name for fraudulent purposes. 293 Therefore, a
transsexual who wishes to change his or her name to reflect his or her true
identity should not be denied the right to do so. Unfortunately, some state
courts continue to make what should be a simple process more difficult and
284.
Id. at 209; Douglas K. Smith, Comment, Transsexualism, Sex
Reassignment Surgery, and the Law, 56 CORNELL L. REV. 963, 969–70 (1971).
285.
355 A.2d 204 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1976).
286.
See id. at 206; Flynn, supra note 262, at 37.
287.
M.T., 355 A.2d at 206.
288.
Id. at 206–07.
289.
Id. at 211.
290.
ALLY WINDSOR HOWELL, TRANSGENDER PERSONS AND THE LAW 16–17
(2013).
291.
E.g., FLA. STAT. § 68.07 (2013).
292.
HOWELL, supra note 290, at 17; see also, e.g., Wisconsin v. Hansford, 580
N.W.2d 171, 173 (Wis. 1998).
293.
See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 68.07(3)(j).
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burdensome for transsexuals by requiring medical documents or doctors’
notes providing the reason for the name change.294
C.

Birth Certificate Amendments

One way in which transsexuals attempt to obtain equal rights and
protections of the law that conform to their self-identity, is through a birth
certificate amendment. 295 Most jurisdictions in the United States have
regulations, statutes, or policies governing birth certificate amendment
procedures to change a person’s sex designation.296 While almost all of these
jurisdictions have straightforward procedures for making an amendment to
fix a mistake or change a person’s name, the policies governing a
transsexual’s ability to amend the sex designation on his or her birth
certificate are unpredictable, expensive, and unnecessarily intrusive.297 State
policies vary on the ability to change the sex designation on a birth certificate
and the procedural requirements for doing so.298 States that do permit such a
change on a person’s birth certificate may issue an amended or a new birth
certificate, requiring proof of either complete SRS or just necessary medical
treatments, and the state may or may not require a court order for changing
the birth certificate.299
Some states confine the ability to change a person’s sex designation
to circumstances where there was a mistake in the declaration on the birth
certificate of either boy or girl, as determined at the time of birth.300 For
example, the Ohio Probate Court held that an individual who was born male,
who is now a post-operative female, could not amend her birth certificate.301
The court interpreted Ohio’s birth certificate statute as “strictly a correction

294.
Transgender Man Denied Name Change by Virginia Judge,
LGBTQNATION (Apr. 17, 2013), http://www.lgbtqnation.com/2013/04/transgender-mandenied-name-change-by-virginia-judge/. For Krysta, just the process of changing her name
took seven months. Interview with Krysta Cascio, supra note 143, at 7.
295.
E.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 103425 (West 2014).
296.
See Kristin Wenstrom, Comment, “What the Birth Certificate Shows”:
An Argument to Remove Surgical Requirements from Birth Certificate Amendment Policies,
17 TUL. J.L. & SEXUALITY 131, 131–33 (2008).
297.
Id.
298.
Changing Birth Certificate Sex Designations: State-by-State Guidelines,
LAMBDA LEGAL, http://www.lambdalegal.org/publications/changing-birth-certificate-sexdesignations-state-by-state-guidelines (last updated Feb. 3, 2015).
299.
Id.
300.
E.g., In re Declaratory Relief for Ladrach, 513 N.E. 2d 828, 831–32 (Ohio
Prob. Ct. 1987).
301.
Id.
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type statute,” permitting a change only when an error was made in the
designation of sex at the time of birth.302
Tennessee actually goes as far as statutorily prohibiting a birth
certificate amendment to reflect a transsexual’s self-identified sex, even postSRS. 303 Similarly, Idaho has a general statute permitting birth certificate
amendments; but the Idaho Office of Vital Statistics shows that Idaho does
not permit birth certificate amendments for post-operative transsexuals.304
States, such as Ohio, Tennessee, and Idaho, that do not permit an
amendment to the sex designation on birth certificates, follow the approach
that a “person’s sex is determined at birth by an anatomical examination by
the birth attendant” and restrict such amendments—absent a showing of error
or inaccuracy—at the time of recording the gender.305 What these states fail
to recognize is the importance of a transsexual’s internal sense of gender
identity. Transsexuals often feel “incongruencies of assigned birth sex,
physical body, and gender identity.”306 In essence, the sex designation on
their birth certificate, as recorded at the time of their birth, is inaccurate.307
Preventing a person from obtaining congruent identity documents reflecting
the appropriate sex, inhibits that person from living as his or her authentic
self and from receiving equal rights and protections under the law.308
Forty-seven states, the District of Columbia, and New York City
allow sex designation amendments or changes to a person’s birth
certificate.309 Almost all of these birth certificate amendment policies require
proof that the applicant has undergone SRS, 310 and many states require a

302.
Id. at 831.
303.
TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-3-203(d) (2014) (stating “[t]he sex of an
individual [will] not be changed on the original certificate of birth as a result of sex change
surgery”).
304.
IDAHO ADMIN. CODE r. 16.02.08.201 (2013); Changing Birth Certificate
Sex Designations: State-by-State Guidelines, supra note 298.
305.
In re Declaratory Relief for Ladrach, 513 N.E.2d at 832; Changing Birth
Certificate Sex Designations: State-by-State Guidelines, supra note 298.
306.
Benjamin L. Jerner, Culturally Competent Representation, in
TRANSGENDER FAMILY LAW: A GUIDE TO EFFECTIVE ADVOCACY 1, 3 (Jennifer L. Levi &
Elizabeth E. Monnin-Browder eds., 2012).
307.
See id.
308.
Wu & Broadus, supra note 257, at 16–17; Wenstrom, supra note 296, at
132–33. But see In re Declaratory Relief for Ladrach, 513 N.E.2d at 832.
309.
Wu & Broadus, supra note 257, at 19─20; see also Changing Birth
Certificate Sex Designations: State by State Guidelines, supra note 298 (demonstrating state
statutes that allow birth certificate amendments with proof of sex reassignment surgery).
310.
E.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 25-2-115(4) (2014) (requiring “a certified copy
of an order of a court of competent jurisdiction indicating that the sex of an individual born in
this state has been changed by surgical procedure”); see also COLO. CODE REGS. § 1006-1-9.3,
.6 (2014).
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court order as a prerequisite to amending a birth certificate.311 Although the
majority of states require complete SRS,312 other states do not specify the
extent of surgery that is required. 313 The particular surgical requirements
outlined by states are critical because the treatment and surgery that
transsexuals undergo “range from relatively minor cosmetic procedures, such
as facial hair removal or breast augmentation for [MTF] patients, to complete
genital reconstructive surgery . . . for patients of both sexes.”314 There are
many reasons why a transsexual would decide not to undergo complete
SRS.315 For instance, there may be health risks associated with surgery, the
transsexual may not be able to afford surgery, and “others simply object to
the idea that the only way to belong to a particular gender is to have anatomy
that conforms to that gender.”316
Furthermore, current understandings of transgender health indicate
the personalized and unique process of gender transition. 317 A statutory
requirement of SRS—as a pre-requisite to amending the sex designation on
one’s birth certificate—is incongruent with transgender health and is unduly
intrusive.318 The more appropriate birth amendment policy that should be
followed by states is one that only requires proof that the transsexual has
completed the treatments necessary for his or her personal transition.319
Virginia was the first state that allowed birth certificate amendments
to a trans person’s proper gender without requiring sex-reassignment
surgery. 320 Prior to 2002, Virginia’s requirements conformed with the
majority of the states, requiring complete genital reconstructive surgery to
amend birth certificates.321 However, Lambda Legal educated the Virginia
Office of Vital Records on the various treatments that trans people undergo
during their transition, and Virginia has changed its amendment requirement
from complete SRS to necessary gender transition treatments.322
311.
E.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 25-2-115.
312.
E.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 46, § 13(e) (2014); see also Changing Birth
Certificate Sex Designations: State-by-State Guidelines, supra note 298.
313.
Changing Birth Certificate Sex Designations: State-by-State Guidelines,
supra note 298.
314.
Audrey C. Stirnitzke, Note, Transsexuality, Marriage, and the Myth of
True Sex, 53 ARIZ. L. REV. 285, 288 (2011); see also COLO. CODE REGS. § 1006-1-9.3, .6.
315.
Stirnitzke, supra note 314, at 288.
316.
Id.
317.
Wenstrom, supra note 296, at 132–33.
318.
Id. 132–34.
319.
Id. at 133–34; see also 12 VA. ADMIN. CODE § 5-550-320 (2014).
320.
12 VA. ADMIN. CODE § 5-550-320; Wenstrom, supra note 296, at 142.
But see Changing Birth Certificate Sex Designations: State-by-State Guidelines, supra note
298.
321.
See Wenstrom, supra note 296, at 142.
322.
Id.
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Driver’s License Amendments

Each state also has its own policies and regulations for changing
name and sex designation on driver’s licenses.323 In order to change one’s
name on a driver’s license, all that is generally required is the court order
documenting the name change. 324 However, in order to change the sex
designation on a driver’s license, the state may require proof from a
physician or psychologist certifying the change of sex.325
States should follow Virginia’s lead and become educated about
transsexual health and the various procedures that transsexuals choose to
undergo other than SRS.326 In moving towards equality, legislatures need to
understand the critical need of transsexuals to live authentic lives in their
self-identified gender and realize that extensive surgical requirements create
a painful, expensive, life-changing, and potentially unnecessary barrier for a
transsexual to obtain congruent documents reflecting their true identity.327
Countries outside of the United States, such as Argentina and the
Netherlands, have acknowledged this need, as evidenced by the recent
legislation enabling transsexuals to change the sex on official documents
without prior judicial or medical approval.328 A transsexual woman from
Buenos Aires, Argentina, expressed her feelings after taking advantage of
Argentina’s new gender-identity law, stating that “‘[it is] important to have
the freedom to decide by myself and not have anyone deciding it instead of
me. . . . [N]o one is authorized to say who I am, but me.’”329
Transsexuals should have access to more efficient methods for
amending their name and sex designation on official documents.330 It is time
for the states to remove the barriers that are preventing the people in our
323.
See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 27-16-506 (2014); Change of Sex or Gender
DEP’T.
OF
MOTOR
VEHICLES,
on
a
DMV
Photo
Document,
N.Y.
http://nysdmv.custhelp.com/app/answers/detail/a_id/405/~/change-of-sex-or-gender-on-admv-photo-document (last updated Aug. 5, 2015, 4:19 PM).
324.
E.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 27-16-506(b).
325.
Change of Sex or Gender on a DMV Photo Document, supra note 323.
326.
See 12 VA. ADMIN. CODE § 5-550-320 (2014); Wenstrom, supra note 296,
at 142.
327.
See The Netherlands: Victory for Transgender Rights, supra note 248;
Warren, supra note 248.
328.
See The Netherlands: Victory for Transgender Rights, supra note 248;
Warren, supra note 248.
329.
Warren, supra note 248.
330.
Obtaining congruent documents is critically important for transsexuals in
reaching equality and recognition of their true identity. See supra Part V.A–D. Inconsistent
documents can make getting jobs difficult, and for Krysta, any inconsistency on her official
documents meant that she would not receive medicine from the pharmacy to treat her Crohn’s
disease. See supra Part V.A–D.
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country from being who they are, in order for our nation to move closer to
achieving equality for all.331
E.

Public Accommodations

Could you imagine if a stressful part of your day was dealing with
public bathroom accommodations you are permitted to use? A decision to
use a public restroom, something that is a seemingly mindless decision to
most, is often “one of the most difficult and stressful parts of a transgender
person’s day.”332 Particularly for trans people who may be in the early stages
of their transition, utilizing the restroom that corresponds to their gender
identity has a potential to create “difficulty, anxiety, and even safety
risks.” 333 There are numerous examples of transgender individuals being
arrested, fined, or charged for using the restroom of his or her self-identified
gender.334
Many cities and counties have public accommodation
nondiscrimination ordinances, some of which include gender identity or
expression.335 However, most of these ordinances do not address the use of
public restrooms, locker rooms, or showers. 336 The ordinances that do
address the use of public restrooms, locker rooms, or showers generally state
that the nondiscrimination ordinance does not apply to discrimination on the
basis of sex or gender in these facilities.337 Only a select few provide express
protection for transitioned transsexuals against discrimination in the use of
public restrooms.338
Furthermore, institutions with sex segregation policies, in organizing
their accommodation programs, create great difficulty for trans people. 339
For example, U.S. prisons that place people in a facility based on their birth
331.
PAISLEY CURRAH & SHANNON MINTER, TRANSGENDER EQUALITY: A
HANDBOOK FOR ACTIVISTS AND POLICYMAKERS 15–16 (Sean Cahill et al. eds., 2000). But see
ARK. CODE ANN. § 27-16-506 (2014); Change of Sex or Gender on a DMV Photo Document,
supra note 323.
332.
Jerner, supra note 306, at 9.
333.
Id.
334.
See, e.g., Transgender Woman Charged with Trespassing, Banned from
Idaho Supermarket for Using Women’s Bathroom, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Apr. 13, 2013, 2:43
PM),
http://www.nydailynews.com/news/national/transgender-woman-banned-idaho-storewomen-restroom-article-1.1315827.
335.
E.g., L.A., CAL., MUNICIPAL CODE § 49.70 (2014).
336.
See, e.g., id.
337.
E.g., BROWARD COUNTY, FLA., CODE OF ORDINANCES ch. 16 1/2, art. II, §
34.1 (2014).
338.
E.g., BOULDER, COLO., REV. CODE ch. 12-1-1, 12-1-4(c) (2013).
339.
See Dean Spade, Documenting Gender, 59 HASTINGS L.J. 731, 752–53
(2008).
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sex can pose great danger for a trans person.340 A transgendered woman,
who was born as a man but looks and identifies as a woman, is subject to
high rates of extreme physical and sexual abuse from other inmates. 341
Under the Eighth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, prisons are required
to provide for inmate’s safety.342 “A prison official’s deliberate indifference
to a substantial risk of serious harm . . . violates the Eighth Amendment.”343
Often the abuse is so great that the transgendered inmate is placed in solitary
confinement or is segregated for their protection.344
Fortunately, the Prison Rape Elimination Act 345 (“PREA”) was
enacted in 2003 in response to the high rate of sexual abuse in prisons,
particularly against homosexual, transgender, and gender nonconforming
individuals.346 The PREA mandates a screening process in federal prisons in
determining whether to assign a trans person to a federal facility with male or
female inmates.347 The U.S. Department of Justice issued final regulations to
implement PREA in May 2012, and will hopefully prove to be effective in
remedying the difficulties faced by the trans population in prison.348 The
PREA is a positive step towards providing transgenders—as well as other atrisk groups—necessary protection, and demonstrates an understanding that
the decision of where to assign a transgender person cannot be based solely
on birth sex. 349 Chelsea Manning, an army soldier previously known as
Bradley Manning, announced that she was a female living in the wrong body
after she was convicted for leaking classified documents.350 Chelsea will be
sent to an all male prison and made a statement that, “[g]iven the way that I
feel and have felt since childhood, I want to begin hormone therapy as soon

340.
BASSICHIS, supra note 260, at 17–18.
341.
Id.
342.
Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994); see also U.S. CONST.
amend. VIII.
343.
Farmer, 511 U.S. at 828.
344.
See id. at 830; BASSICHIS, supra note 260, at 22–23.
345.
42 U.S.C. § 15601 (2012).
346.
LGBT People and the Prison Rape Elimination Act, NAT’L CTR. FOR
TRANSGENDER EQUAL. (July 2012), http://www.transequality.org/Resources/PREA_
July2012.pdf.
347.
28 C.F.R. § 115.42(a), (c) (2013).
348.
LGBT People and the Prison Rape Elimination Act, supra note 346.
349.
See 28 C.F.R. § 115.42(c); LGBT People and the Prison Rape Elimination
Act, supra note 346.
350.
Adam Gabbatt, ‘I am Chelsea Manning,’ Says Jailed Soldier Formerly
Known
as
Bradley,
GUARDIAN (Aug.
22,
2013,
12:35 EDT),
http://
www.theguardian.com/world/2013/aug/22/bradley-manning-woman-chelsea-genderreassignment.
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as possible.”351 While in prison, she is prepared to take her plea for receiving
gender reassignment treatment to court.352
Similar sex segregation issues exist with the placement of trans
individuals in homeless shelters.353 The majority of homeless shelters and
other social service shelters house people according to his or her birth sex.354
These policies often lead to harassment and assault against the transgender
person by others housed in the facility. 355 The potential harassment and
violence results in trans people avoiding homeless shelters. 356 Homeless
shelters in a minority of jurisdictions, including San Francisco, Boston,
Washington, D.C., and New York City, have policies permitting transgender
people to be housed according to their self-identified gender.357 Homeless
shelters are in place to assist those in need; consequently, sex segregation
policies that have the effect of transgender individuals avoiding such
facilities clearly should be changed.358
Every person deserves equal access to appropriate public
accommodations, such as restrooms, prisons, and homeless shelters, without
fear of harassment or physical violence. No person should be afraid to use
the restroom of their self-identified gender, and sex segregation policies
should be changed in prisons and homeless shelters in order to prevent the
harassment or violence that results when a transgender person is placed with
his or her birth sex rather than his or her self-identified gender.359
VIII.

STATE/LOCAL & FEDERAL ANTI-DISCRIMINATION STATUTES

Transsexuals experience severe discrimination and are in dire need
of legislative protection in areas such as: healthcare, employment, education,
housing, public accommodations, law enforcement, and in many other
areas.360 In order to reach equality and provide transsexuals with the same

351.
Id.
352.
Denver Nicks, Chelsea Manning Prepared to Take Gender Reassignment
Plea to Court, TIME (Nov. 1, 2013), http://www.nation.time.com/2013/11/01/chelseamanning-prepared-to-take-gender-reassignment-plea-to-court/.
353.
Spade, supra note 339, at 752–53.
354.
Id. at 753.
355.
Id.
356.
Id.
357.
Id. at 736.
358.
See Spade, supra note 339, at 752–53.
359.
See Jerner, supra note 306, at 9; Spade, supra note 339, at 753; Gabbatt,
supra note 350.
360.
CURRAH & MINTER, supra note 331, at 16.
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rights and privileges as any other citizen, legislators and policymakers must
remedy these injustices through trans-protective legislation.361
Many states have laws prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sex
and sexual orientation; however, these laws do not provide protection for the
trans community.362 Where society has failed and remains close-minded to
those who are perceived as not normal, the law must step up and provide
protection.363 Unfortunately, for trans people, where society has failed, so
too has the law.364
A.

Anti-Discrimination Laws at the State Level

Activists continue to fight for equal civil rights protections, and the
greatest impact and progress has been at the local and state level.365 “By
adding or amending definitions of sex, gender, or even sexual orientation, or
by adding a new category, usually gender identity, legislation can make it
clear to the courts that nondiscrimination laws should and do include gender
nonconforming people.” 366 In 1993, Minnesota became the first state to
enact a statute prohibiting discrimination against trans people by defining
sexual orientation to include “having or being perceived as having . . . a selfimage or identity not traditionally associated with one’s biological maleness
or femaleness.”367 Luckily, other states followed suit, and in the years that
followed, states such as California, Georgia, Illinois, Iowa, Michigan,
Missouri, and Vermont began introducing non-discrimination laws for trans
people.368
States that have extended anti-discrimination protection to
transsexuals have done so in a number of ways. 369 Some states have
explicitly included gender identity as protected under anti-discrimination

361.
Id.
362.
See, e.g., N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 292(10), (11), (27) (consol. 2014); N.Y.
EXEC. LAW § 296(1)(a)–(b), (2)(a) (banning discrimination based on sexual orientation in
employment, housing, and public accommodations, but gender identity is not protected); 2009
Md. Laws 540, 552–53, 558–59 (prohibiting discrimination in employment, housing, and
public accommodations on the basis of sexual orientation).
363.
See CURRAH & MINTER, supra note 331, at 16.
364.
See, e.g., Littleton v. Prange, 9 S.W.3d 223, 230–31 (Tex. App. 1999).
365.
CURRAH & MINTER, supra note 331, at 15.
366.
Currah, supra note 269, at 21.
367.
MINN. STAT. § 363A.03(44) (2013); see also CURRAH & MINTER, supra
note 331, at 15.
368.
CURRAH & MINTER, supra note 331, at 15.
369.
Id. at 15–16; see, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-34-301(7) (2014); N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 10:5-12 (West 2014).
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statutes, 370 other states prohibit discrimination based on sexual orientation
and include gender identity or expression within the definition of sexual
orientation,371 and a few states prohibit discrimination on the basis of sex,
and include gender identity within the statutory definition of sex.372
New Jersey’s Law Against Discrimination provides a good example
of an ideal trans-inclusive anti-discrimination law.373 In New Jersey, “[a]ll
persons shall have the opportunity to obtain employment, and to obtain all
the accommodations, advantages, facilities, and privileges of any place of
public accommodation, publicly assisted housing accommodation, and other
real property without discrimination because of . . . gender identity or
expression.” 374 Further, transgender youth are protected in school from
harassment, intimidation or bullying based on gender identity.375
States, such as Colorado, which have extended anti-discrimination
protection to trans people through an expanded statutory definition of sexual
orientation or sex is an improvement, but there is still room for
misinterpretation.376 In order to prevent any ambiguity or misinterpretation,
gender identity should be expressly placed alongside other protected
categories.377 California has recognized this distinction, as evidenced by the
recent amendment to its existing anti-discrimination law, which previously
defined gender identity within the protected class of sexual orientation.378
The law was amended in 2012, distinctly making gender identity and gender
expression their own protected classes. 379 This decision was based on
confusion that existed among employers and landlords about whether trans

370.
See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-12.c (The New Jersey Law Against
Discrimination prohibits discrimination based on sexual orientation, gender identity, or
expression in employment, housing, public accommodation, credit and business contracts).
371.
See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-34-301(7).
372.
See, e.g., Assemb. B. 887, 2011 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2011).
373.
See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-4.
374.
Id. (emphasis added).
375.
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:37-14.
376.
E.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-34-301(7).
377.
See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-4. But see COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 2434-402(1)(a)–(b).
378.
CAL. CIV. CODE § 51(b), (e)(5) (West 2012); see also Assemb. B. 887,
2011 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2011).
379.
CAL. CIV. CODE § 51(b), (e)(5); see also Assemb. B. 887, 2011 Leg., Reg.
Sess. (Cal. 2011).
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people were protected under the law.380 The amendment removed any such
confusion and strengthened the state’s anti-discrimination law.381
Currently, sixteen states and the District of Columbia have laws
prohibiting discrimination on the basis of gender identity or expression.382
The extent of protection within these laws vary, encompassing all or a few of
categories including employment, public accommodations, housing, credit,
and education.383 States should continue to strive to provide comprehensive
protections for trans people in all aspects of life.
B.

Healthcare

The trans community faces unfortunate health care discrimination by
being denied equal access to health care services. 384 Transsexuals face
discrimination and hostility from medical professionals and insurance
providers. 385 Most private insurance plans deny coverage for transitionrelated treatment, and many state Medicaid and Medicare programs exclude
such coverage as well.386
States that participate in the Medicaid program receive grants from
the federal government to assist state health care services in providing
necessary medical services to qualified state residents. 387 Although each
state sets its own qualifying guidelines, “[t]he Medicaid agency may not
arbitrarily deny or reduce the amount, duration, or scope of a required
service . . . to an otherwise eligible beneficiary solely because of the

380.
See Ari Rosenstein, California Passes AB 887:
The Gender
Nondiscrimination Act, CPEHR BLOG (Oct. 31, 2011), http://www.smallbizhrblog.com/
california-passes-ab-887-the-gender-nondiscrimination-act.html; see also Cal. Assemb. B.
887.
381.
Rosenstein, supra note 380; see also Cal. Assemb. B. 887.
382.
Non-Discrimination Laws That Include Gender Identity and Expression,
TRANSGENDER L. & POL’Y INST., http://www.transgenderlaw.org/ndlaws/#jurisdictions (last
updated Feb. 1, 2012); see also NAT’L CTR. FOR LESBIAN RIGHTS, STATE BY STATE GUIDE TO
LAWS THAT PROHIBIT DISCRIMINATION AGAINST TRANSGENDER PEOPLE, NAT’L RES. CTR. ON
LGBT
AGING
2–3
(2010),
http://www.lgbtagingcenter.org/resources/pdfs/
StateLawsThatProhibitDiscriminationAgainstTransPeople.pdf.
383.
NAT’L CTR. FOR LESBIAN RIGHTS, supra note 382, at 3–4.
384.
TLC HEALTH CARE ACCESS PROJECT, TRANSGENDER HEALTH AND THE
LAW: IDENTIFYING AND FIGHTING HEALTH CARE DISCRIMINATION (2004), available at
http://www.thecentersd.org/pdf/health-advocacy/identifying-transgender.pdf.
385.
Id.
386.
Id.; KELLAN BAKER & ANDREW CRAY, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, WHY
GENDER-IDENTITY NONDISCRIMINATION IN INSURANCE MAKES SENSE 1–2 (2013),
http://www.americanprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/05/BakerNondiscrimination
Insurance-6.pdf.
387.
42 U.S.C. § 1396 (2012).
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diagnosis, type of illness, or condition.”388 Additionally, private insurance
plans have even denied coverage to trans people for medical needs unrelated
to gender transition.389 For example, an insurance company might argue that
a medical concern—such as liver damage—resulted from transition related
hormone treatment.390
Many state Medicaid programs explicitly deny coverage for
transition-related treatment; however, a few state courts have struck down
such blanket exclusions. 391 States that explicitly deny coverage for trans
people justify these denials on the belief that such services are not medically
necessary, or that such treatment is cosmetic. 392 These justifications are
unfounded because mental health professionals may deem gender transition
treatment—which may include surgery, hormone therapy, or medication—to
be medically necessary for a trans person. 393 Therefore, the states that
participate in the Medicaid program that deny necessary medical services to
qualified state residents violate federal law.394
For example, in Iowa, procedures for treating gender identity
disorder are specifically excluded from Medicaid coverage.395 In Smith v.
Rasmussen,396 the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld this blanket denial
of transition related treatment under its Medicaid program. 397 The court
found the blanket prohibition on funding for sex reassignment surgery to be
reasonable and consistent with the Medicaid Act due to the “evolving nature
of the diagnosis and treatment of gender identity disorder and the
disagreement regarding the efficacy of sex reassignment surgery.”398
Fortunately, there are states that have struck down total trans-related
treatment exclusions from coverage. 399 In Doe v. Department of Public
Welfare,400 the Supreme Court of Minnesota held that the “total exclusion of
transsexual surgery from eligibility for [medical assistance payments was] . .
388.
42 C.F.R. § 440.230(c) (2012).
389.
See BAKER & CRAY, supra note 386, at 2; TLC HEALTH CARE ACCESS
PROJECT, supra note 384.
390.
TLC HEALTH CARE ACCESS PROJECT, supra note 384.
391.
BAKER & CRAY, supra note 386, at 1–2; see also, e.g., Doe v. Dep’t of
Pub. Welfare, 257 N.W.2d 816, 820 (Minn. 1977) (“[T]otal exclusion of transsexual surgery
from eligibility for M.A. benefits . . . is void.”).
392.
BAKER & CRAY, supra note 386, at 2.
393.
Id. at 2, 5.
394.
See id. at 3.
395.
IOWA ADMIN. CODE r. 441-78.1(4)(b)(2) (2014).
396.
249 F.3d 755 (8th Cir. 2001).
397.
Id. at 761–62.
398.
Id. at 761; see also Medicaid Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-97, § 121, 79
Stat. 186, 343 (codified as amended at 26 U.S.C. § 3201 (2012)).
399.
E.g., Doe v. Dep’t of Pub. Welfare, 257 N.W.2d 816, 820 (Minn. 1977).
400.
257 N.W.2d 816 (Minn. 1977).
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. void.” 401 In reaching this decision, the court discussed transsexualism
generally and found that in certain cases, “[t]he only medical procedure
known to be successful in treating . . . transsexualism is the radical sex
conversion surgical procedure.”402 Therefore, a total exclusion of transsexual
surgery from benefits under the medical assistance program is improper, and
future determinations of the medical necessity of an applicant “must be
considered individually, on a case-by-case basis.”403
Removing exclusions for transition-related treatment is critical in
providing the trans community with equal access to health care. 404
“[C]ategorical exclusions are based on the false premise that the health care
services that transgender people need are not medically necessary.” 405 In
reality, there are unfortunate consequences for trans people who are denied
necessary health care and treatment.406 Lack of access to gender-transition
medical care is linked with health consequences that include depression,
anxiety, suicide, infections—such as HIV—and other health risks associated
with seeking treatment on the black market.407
A few other states have made progress and are taking steps in the
direction of achieving the goal of equal access to healthcare.408 For example,
in 2012, California became the first state to expressly “prohibit insurance
discrimination against transgender people.”409 The California Department of
Insurance issued guidelines and regulations that ensure equal health care
insurance coverage to the trans community. 410 Similarly, Colorado, 411
Oregon, 412 and Vermont 413 have all issued bulletins prohibiting insurance
discrimination based on gender identity or expression.414
401.
Id. at 820.
402.
Id. at 819.
403.
Id. at 820.
404.
See BAKER & CRAY, supra note 386, at 2.
405.
Id. at 2.
406.
Id. at 2.
407.
Pooja S. Gehi & Gabriel Arkles, Unraveling Injustice: Race and Class
Impact of Medicaid Exclusions of Transition-Related Health Care for Transgender People,
SEXUALITY RES. & SOC. POL’Y: J. OF NSRC, Dec. 2007, at 7, 15. Access to gender transition
treatments is critical for transgender people. Before Serafima began her transition treatments
she experienced depression and attempted suicide on two occasions. See supra text
accompanying notes 191–93.
408.
BAKER & CRAY, supra note 386, at 3.
409.
Id.
410.
See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1365.5(a)–(e) (West 2014).
411.
DIV. OF INS., COLO. DEP’T OF REGULATORY AGENCIES, BULL. NO. B-4.49,
INSURANCE UNFAIR PRACTICES ACT PROHIBITIONS ON DISCRIMINATION BASED UPON SEXUAL
ORIENTATION (2013).
412.
OR. INS. DIV., DEP’T OF CONSUMER & BUS. SERVS., BULL. INS 2012-1,
APPLICATION OF SENATE BILL 2 (2007 LEGISLATIVE SESSION) TO GENDER IDENTITY ISSUES IN
THE TRANSACTION AND REGULATION OF INSURANCE IN OREGON (2012).
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Although a few states have struck down blanket exclusions that
discriminate against trans people, 415 or have issued regulations against
insurance discrimination based on gender,416 the majority of the nation has a
long way to go in providing transsexuals with equal access to the health care
services they need.417
Private and public health insurance programs should not arbitrarily
deny coverage to transsexuals for medically necessary treatment. 418 The
remaining majority of the states should model the legislative decisions of
states—such as California—by removing blanket exclusions of transitionrelated treatment and enacting regulations prohibiting insurance
discrimination against trans people.419
C.

Anti-Discrimination Laws and Protections at the Federal Level

Although progress has been slower at the federal level, there have
been some positive changes and protections in certain areas of the law that
have been extended to reach the transgender community.420 For example, in
2009 the Matthew Shepard and James Byrd, Jr. Hate Crimes Prevention Act
was signed into federal law, expanding federal hate crime legislation to
protect transgender people.421
Further, Title IX of the Education Amendments—which protects
people from sex discrimination in education programs—has been extended to
protect transgender students through a settlement agreement.422 However, by
far the most progress has been made in providing the trans community with
much needed protection from employment discrimination.423

413.
DIV. OF INS., VT. DEP’T OF FIN. REGULATION, BULL. NO. 174, GUIDANCE
REGARDING PROHIBITED DISCRIMINATION ON THE BASIS OF GENDER IDENTITY INCLUDING
MEDICALLY NECESSARY GENDER DYSPHORIA SURGERY AND RELATED HEALTH CARE (2013).
414.
BAKER & CRAY, supra note 386, at 3.
415.
E.g., J.D. v. Lackner, 145 Cal. Rptr. 570, 572 (Ct. App. 1978) (striking
down Medi-Cal’s blanket policy excluding coverage for transition-related treatment).
416.
E.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1365.5 (West 2014).
417.
See BAKER & CRAY, supra note 386, at 3.
418.
See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1365.5.
419.
E.g., id.
420.
See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 249 (2012).
421.
Id. § 249(a)(2).
422.
20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (2012); see also Macy, No. 0120120821, 2012 WL
1435995, at *6 n.6 (EEOC Apr. 20, 2012).
423.
See Macy, 2012 WL 1435995, at *11.
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Employment—Title VII

Another major area of discrimination faced by the trans community
is in employment. 424 Trans people face discrimination in various
circumstances concerning employment.425 A trans person may not be hired,
may be fired if going through transition while employed, or may be fired if
his or her transgender status is discovered.426
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits employment
discrimination on the basis of “race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin.”427 Originally, Title VII was interpreted to protect employees from
sex discrimination and did not protect employment discrimination against
trans employees. 428 However, in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 429 the
“Supreme Court [of the United States] concluded that gender stereotyping is
sex discrimination under Title VII.”430 The Court held that, under Title VII,
an employer may not discriminate against employees based on gender
stereotypes, stating “we are beyond the day when an employer could
evaluate employees by assuming or insisting that they matched the
stereotype associated with their group.”431
The Price Waterhouse decision:
[U]nlock[s] the shackles that tether personality, mannerisms,
preferences, and tastes to a particular biological container. After
Price Waterhouse, because a body is branded female does not
mean that she performs as the charm school graduate, “walk[s] . . .
femininely, talk[s] . . . femininely, dress[es] . . . femininely,” . . .
[and] a body, branded male need not be aggressive or macho.432

Although Price Waterhouse did not involve a trans individual, this
case illustrates the catch 22 experienced by trans people in the workplace.433
A trans person who is just trying to be his or her self faces discrimination
424.
Kylar W. Broadus, The Evolution of Employment Discrimination
Protections for Transgender People, in TRANSGENDER RIGHTS 93, 93 (Paisley Currah et al.
eds., 2006).
425.
Id.
426.
Id.
427.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2012).
428.
Ulane v. E. Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1081, 1085 (7th Cir. 1984).
429.
490 U.S. 228 (1989).
430.
Amy D. Ronner, Let’s Get the “Trans” and “Sex” Out of It and Free Us
All, 16 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 859, 866 (2013); see also Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 250–
51.
431.
Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 251.
432.
Ronner, supra note 430, at 874 (quoting Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at
235).
433.
Id. at 890; see also Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 235, 251.
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both pre-transition, for failing to conform to gender stereotypes, and posttransition for being a fraud.434
Fortunately, after Price Waterhouse, more cases continued to
favorably interpret Title VII and provide protection for trans people in the
workplace.435 In a recent ruling, the federal Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (“EEOC”)—a federal agency authorized to enforce federal laws
that prohibit workplace discrimination—held that transgender people are
protected under Title VII’s sex discrimination provisions.436 Based on the
rulings in federal court cases involving the interpretation of Title VII and
transgender discrimination, the EEOC “conclude[d] that intentional
discrimination against a transgender individual because that person is
transgender is, by definition, discrimination based on . . . sex, and such
discrimination therefore violates Title VII.”437
Although these precedential rulings interpreting Title VII to provide
protection for transgender people in the workplace are favorable, ultimately
specific federal legislation embodying protection for transgender people is
the most impactful. 438 Luckily, the Employment Non-Discrimination Act
(“ENDA”), which was introduced in Congress in June of 2009, was finally
passed by the Senate on November 7, 2013. 439 This “major civil rights
legislation . . . protects lesbian, gay, bisexual, and for the first time ever,
transgender Americans from discrimination in the workplace.”440
ENDA extends federal employment discrimination protection
currently provided under Title VII to sexual orientation and gender
identity.441 The passage of this Act is a huge achievement and provides trans
people equal rights and protection against discrimination in the workplace.442

434.
435.
436.

See Ronner, supra note 430 at 890–92.
E.g., Smith v. City of Salem, 378 F.3d 566, 572–75 (6th Cir. 2004).
Macy, No. 0120120821, 2012 WL 1435995, at *11 (EEOC Apr. 20,

2012).
437.
Id.; see also Glenn v. Brumby, 663 F.3d 1312, 1320 (11th Cir. 2011)
(holding that Title VII prohibits gender stereotyping); Smith, 378 F.3d at 574–75 (holding that
discrimination based on sex encompasses gender discrimination); Schwenk v. Hartford, 204
F.3d 1187, 1202 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that the term sex includes both the biological
differences between males and females as well as gender).
438.
See Smith, 378 F.3d at 572–74; Macy, 2012 WL 1435995, at *11; Lauren
Fox, Senate Passes ENDA in Bipartisan Vote, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT (Nov. 7, 2013,
3:05
PM),
http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2013/11/07/senate-passes-enda-inbipartisan-vote.
439.
Employment Non-Discrimination Act of 2013, S. 815, 113th Cong. (as
passed by Senate, Nov. 7, 2013); see also Fox, supra note 438.
440.
Fox, supra note 438.
441.
S. 815 § 4(a)(1).
442.
See id.; Fox, supra note 438.
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MARRIAGE

The recognition or authorization of a trans person’s marriage
depends on three primary factors: (1) how that state defines the legal sex of
trans individuals; (2) what the sex of the trans person’s partner is; and (3)
what the state’s law is on same-sex marriage. 443 The marriage of a trans
person is further affected by the individual’s status as either post-transition or
pre-transition.444
In the minority of states that have legalized same-sex marriage, a
trans individual can marry—regardless of that state’s determination of his or
her legal sex—because both same-sex and opposite-sex couples are afforded
the right to marry. 445 Whether a trans person is pre-transition or posttransition prior to entering into the marriage would have no effect, since the
legal sex of the individual is not a determining factor in the legality of the
marriage. 446 Further, a marriage would not be invalidated if a trans
individual went through a transition and had a legal sex change after the
marriage.447 In 2003, Massachusetts became the first state to legalize samesex marriage, effectively creating marriage equality for all couples,
irrespective of sex.448 To date, same-sex marriage is legal in thirty-six states
and the District of Columbia. 449 While these states have recognized the
importance of marriage equality for all-sex couples, the minority of the
United States continues to prohibit same-sex marriage.450
The trans community faces great obstacles in the ability to marry in
states that prohibit same-sex marriage.451 A trans person living in a state that
443.
Elizabeth E. Monnin-Browder, Relationship Recognition and Protections,
in TRANSGENDER FAMILY LAW: A GUIDE TO EFFECTIVE ADVOCACY 36, 36 (Jennifer L. Levi &
Elizabeth E. Monnin-Browder eds., 2012).
444.
Id.
445.
See id. at 37–38; Same-Sex Marriage Fast Facts, CNN, http://
www.cnn.com/2013/05/28/us/same-sex-marriage-fast-facts/index.html (last updated Aug. 24,
2015).
446.
Monnin-Browder, supra note 443, at 37–38.
447.
Id.
448.
Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E. 2d 941, 948, 961 (Mass.
2003); Same-Sex Marriage Fast Facts, supra note 445.
449.
Same-Sex Marriage Fast Facts, supra note 445. Same-sex marriage is
legal in: Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida,
Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota,
Montana, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina,
Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Utah, Vermont, Virginia,
Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin and Wyoming. Id.
450.
See id.
451.
See In re Estate of Gardiner, 42 P.3d 120, 136 (Kan. 2002); In re
Application for Marriage License for Nash, Nos. 2002-T-0149, 2002-T-0179, 2003 WL
23097095, at *1, *9 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 31, 2003).

https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol39/iss2/1

44

Ph.D, ACSW/LMSW et al.: Identity: Societal And Legal Ramifications With Special Focus On

2015]

IDENTITY

161

prohibits same-sex marriage may face difficulty prior to entering into a
marriage or, alternatively, his or her spouse or a third party may challenge
the validity of an existing marriage.452 Additionally, Congress’ enactment of
the Defense of Marriage Act (“DOMA”) creates issues for same-sex couples
who are legally married.453
A.

DOMA’s Effect at the State Level

Due to Congress’ enactment of DOMA, each state, at its option, can
choose to reject a legalized same-sex marriage from another state.454 DOMA
states: “No [s]tate . . . of the United States . . . shall be required to give effect
to any public act, record, or judicial proceeding of any other [s]tate . . .
respecting a relationship between persons of the same sex that is treated as a
marriage under the laws of such other [s]tate . . . .”455 Essentially, section 2
of DOMA grants the states an exception to the Full Faith and Credit Clause
by allowing a state to not recognize the legal same-sex marriage granted to a
couple in another state.456
To illustrate the impact of section 2, attorneys for the National
Center for Lesbian Rights (“NCLR”), an advocacy organization for the
LGBT community, has noted that “within the space of a day’s travel across
state lines, the same two individuals may be legally married in one state,
demoted to domestic partners in another, and treated as complete legal
strangers in a third.”457
Section 2 of DOMA will not affect a post-transition marriage
between two individuals if they were determined to be opposite-sex spouses
at the time of the marriage.458 DOMA only relates to interstate recognition
of marriages between same-sex couples. 459 Thus, once again, the state’s
determination of a trans person’s legal sex for the purpose of marriage comes
into effect in determining whether the couple is a same-sex or opposite-sex
452.
See In re Estate of Gardiner, 42 P.3d at 121–22, 136; In re Application for
a Marriage License for Nash, 2003 WL 23097095, at *1, *9.
453.
1 U.S.C. § 7 (2012), declared unconstitutional by United States v.
Windsor, No. 12-307 (U.S. June 26, 2013); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2012).
454.
28 U.S.C. § 1738C.
455.
Id.
456.
See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1 (“Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each
State to the public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State.”); Defense of
Marriage Act of 1996 § 2, 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2012).
457.
Shannon Minter & Christopher Stoll, Legal Developments in Marriage
Law for Same-Sex Couples, GEN. PRAC. SOLO & SMALL FIRM DIV., Jan.Feb. 2010, at 30, 31–
32; see also Defense of Marriage Act of 1996 § 2.
458.
See Defense of Marriage Act of 1996 § 2; Monnin-Browder, supra note
443, at 39–40.
459.
28 U.S.C. § 1738C.
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couple.460 If determined to be a same-sex couple, section 2 of DOMA will
affect them by giving other states the power not to recognize the individuals
as a legally married same-sex couple. 461 Essentially, states that prohibit
same-sex marriage do not have to give full faith and credit to a legally
married same-sex couple from another state.462
B.

DOMA’s Effect at the Federal Level

Section 3 of DOMA defined marriage for federal purposes as: “[A]
legal union between one man and one woman as husband and wife, and the
word spouse refers only to a person of the opposite sex who is a husband or a
wife.”463 This definition of marriage prevents legal same-sex marriages from
being recognized at a federal level, irrespective of the validity of that
marriage at the state level.464
In United States v. Windsor, 465 the Supreme Court was presented
with the question of “[w]hether [s]ection 3 of DOMA violates the Fifth
Amendment’s guarantee of equal protection of the laws as applied to persons
of the same sex who are legally married under the laws of their [s]tate.”466 In
this case, Edie Windsor and Thea Spyer had a legally recognized marriage in
the state of New York.467 Upon Spyer’s death, Windsor as sole beneficiary
of Spyer’s estate was required to pay $365,053 in federal estate tax because
“their marriage was not respected by the federal government.”468
The Supreme Court found Section 3 of DOMA unconstitutional “as
a deprivation of the [equal] liberty of . . . person[s] [that is] protected by the
Fifth Amendment.”469 Under Section 3 of DOMA, the federal government
was infringing on the authority of states to define and regulate marriage

460.
Monnin-Browder supra note 443, at 36.
461.
28 U.S.C. § 1738C.
462.
Id.
463.
Defense of Marriage Act of 1996 § 3, 1 U.S.C. § 7, declared
unconstitutional by United States v. Windsor, No. 12-307 (U.S. June 26, 2013).
464.
See id.
465.
No. 12-307, slip op. at 1 (U.S. June 26, 2013), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct.
2884 (2013).
466.
Petition for Writ of Certiorari at I, United States v. Windsor, No. 12-307,
slip op. (U.S. June 26, 2013), 2013 WL 3991414; see also Defense of Marriage Act of 1996 §
3.
467.
Windsor, No. 12-307, slip op. at 2–3.
468.
Marriage at the Supreme Court in 2013, FREEDOM TO MARRY,
http://www.freedomtomarry.org/landscape/entry/c/supreme-court (last visited Aug. 25, 2015);
see also Windsor, No. 12-307, slip op. at 3.
469.
Windsor, No. 12-307, slip op. at 25; see also Defense of Marriage Act of
1996 § 3.
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within their laws. 470 The federal government’s restrictions of benefits to
same-sex couples was “directed to a class of persons that the laws of New
York, and . . . [eleven] other [s]tates, have sought to protect.” 471 This
decision had the effect of providing married same-sex couples—living in
states where same-sex marriage was legal—over 1100 federal benefits that
were previously denied to them through DOMA.472
In a similar victory, California’s Proposition 8, which amended the
California Constitution to prohibit same-sex marriage, 473 was ruled
unconstitutional by a district court and the Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit.474 The Supreme Court ruled that the proponents of Proposition 8 did
not have standing to appeal the decision and sent the case back to the appeals
court with instructions to dismiss the appeal.475 Although the Supreme Court
allowed the lower court ruling that invalidated Proposition 8 to stand, its
ruling was narrow, having the effect of striking down California’s
Proposition 8, but dodging the substantive issues of the constitutionality of
same-sex marriage.476
Therefore, the Supreme Court has yet to reach a substantive
conclusion about the constitutionality of prohibitions on same-sex
marriage.477 Instead of sending the case back to the court of appeals, the
Supreme Court should have used this appeal as an opportunity to rule on the
constitutionality of prohibitions on same-sex marriage. Same-sex marriage
prohibitions directly conflict with the legal conclusions and principles set
forth in Loving v. Virginia.478 The Supreme Court struck down the Virginia
law that prohibited marriages between people of different racial classes.479
The Court held the law unconstitutional, as violative of the Fourteenth
Amendment, stating that “[u]nder our Constitution, the freedom to marry, or
not marry, a person of another race resides with the individual and cannot be
infringed by the State.”480 This decision was monumental for the civil rights
470.
Defense of Marriage Act of 1996 § 3; see also Windsor, No 12-307, slip
op. at 18–19.
471.
Windsor, No 12-307, slip op. at 16.
472.
Windsor, No 12-307, slip op. at 23, 25; Marriage at the Supreme Court in
2013, supra note 468; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2012).
473.
CAL. CONST. art. I, § 7.5.
474.
Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052, 1096 (9th Cir. 2012) (holding Proposition
8 unconstitutional).
475.
Hollingsworth v. Perry, No. 12-144, slip op. at 17 (U.S. June 26, 2013).
476.
See id.
477.
See id.
478.
388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967); Julian Bond, Why Prop 8 Must Fall: Civil Rights,
USA TODAY (June 10, 2011, 2:07 PM), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/opinion/
forum/2011-06-10-In-wake-of-Loving-decision-Prop-8-cannot-stand_n.htm.
479.
Loving, 388 U.S. at 11–12.
480.
Id. at 12.
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movement, and the Lovings’ struggle to achieve marriage equality in 1967, is
deeply connected to the fight for civil rights experienced by same-sex
couples today.481 Just like the Supreme Court ruled in Loving, that “[t]he
freedom to marry. . . . a person of another race resides with the individual,”
so too should the Court conclude today, that the freedom to marry a person
of the same-sex resides with the individual, and cannot be infringed by the
State.482
As Mildred Loving reflected on the impact of her case, she stated:
I am proud that Richard’s and my name is on a court case
that can help reinforce the love, the commitment, the fairness, and
the family that so many people, black or white, young or old, gay
or straight seek in life. I support the freedom to marry for all.
....
That’s what Loving, and loving, are all about.483

C.

States That Ban Same-Sex Marriage

In states that limit the right to marry to heterosexual couples, the
states’ identification of a trans individual’s legal sex is the key-determining
factor in a trans’ ability to marry. 484 That determination leads into the
question of whether the state perceives the proposed marriage to be between
same-sex or different-sex individuals. 485 As discussed above, in certain
states a trans person can legally change his or her sex.486 Accordingly, what
may have been perceived as a same-sex couple pre-transition, would be an
opposite-sex couple post-transition and legal sex change. 487 Nevertheless,
there are states that do not recognize a trans individual’s changed sex for the
purposes of marriage.488
As discussed above, states vary in their determination of legal sex
and the ability of trans people to change their legal sex to reflect their gender
identity.489 States are further divided on their recognition of a trans person’s
legal sex specifically for the purposes of marriage.490
481.
Id.; Bond, supra note 478.
482.
Loving, 388 U.S. at 12.
483.
Bond, supra note 478.
484.
See Flynn, supra note 262, at 33.
485.
Monnin-Browder, supra note 443, at 40.
486.
See supra Part V.A–D.
487.
See Monnin-Browder, supra note 443, at 40.
488.
See, e.g., In re Application for Marriage License for Nash, Nos. 2002-T0149, 2002-T-0179, 2003 WL 23097095, at *9 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 31, 2003).
489.
See supra text accompanying notes 262–68.
490.
See Flynn, supra note 262, at 33–34.
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There are two opposing standards utilized by courts in determining
the validity of post-transition marriages: (1) the state finds sex as immutable
and fixed at birth, refusing to acknowledge sex-reassignment surgery,
psychological factors of gender identity, or birth certificate amendments for
the purpose of marriage;491 or (2) the state acknowledges a change to a birth
certificate and recognizes that legal sex change for the purpose of
marriage.492
For the purpose of marriage,
[d]ifferent jurisdictions . . . can and have come to different
conclusions about how to determine legal sex: most take the
essentialist approach that sex is immutable and fixed at birth, while
a small minority recognizes the complexities of sex and looks to a
person’s gender identity as the primary determinant of legal sex.493

1.

Biological Approach—Sex Is Immutable and Fixed at Birth

The issue of legal sex for the purpose of ascertaining the validity of a
transsexual marriage was first analyzed in Corbett v. Corbett, 494 a 1970
British case.495 The issue in this case was a determination of the true sex of
April Ashley, a post-operative MTF transsexual, for the purpose of
concluding whether the marriage she entered into with Arthur Corbett was
valid.496 In assessing the legal sex of April, the court analyzed chromosomal
factors, gonadal factors, genital factors, and psychological factors. 497
However, the court failed to discuss the psychological factors for assessing
April’s legal sex, and stated that the essential criteria must be biological.498
The court further stated that the “biological sexual constitution of an
individual is fixed at birth—at the latest—and cannot be changed . . . by
medical or surgical means.” 499 Therefore, the court concluded that the
marriage between April and Arthur was void, since April “is not a woman
for the purposes of marriage.”500 The narrow biological test and principles
set forth in Corbett have been followed by courts that have concluded that

491.
492.
493.
494.
495.
496.
497.
498.
499.
500.
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See, e.g., Littleton v. Prange, 9 S.W.3d 223, 231 (Tex. App. 1999).
E.g., M.T. v. J.T., 355 A.2d 204, 209 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1976).
Flynn, supra note 262, at 33.
[1971] P. 83 (Eng.).
Id. at 83.
Id. at 84–85.
Id. at 100.
Id. at 106.
Corbett, P. 83 at 104.
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sex is immutable, unchanged by psychological identity, SRS, or amended
birth certificates.501
Courts that have followed the conclusions of Corbett, disregarding
the critical psychological and social factors in determining a person’s sex,
have both denied marriage licenses and invalidated existing marriages.502 As
previously mentioned, the majority of the states allow sex designation
amendments to an individual’s birth certificate upon proof of the
transsexual’s completed SRS. 503 Surprisingly, even an amended birth
certificate, reflecting the transsexual’s true, self-identified sex, does not
guarantee the security of a transsexual’s marriage, because courts have
refused to recognize a transsexual’s post-transition sex for the purposes of
marriage, notwithstanding the existence of an amended birth certificate.504
In In re Application for Marriage License for Nash, 505 an Ohio
appellate court denied a marriage license to a post-operative FTM
transsexual with a female. 506 Nash, the FTM transsexual, successfully
amended his out-of-state birth certificate to reflect a change in sex from
female to male after undergoing SRS.507 However, the Ohio court refused to
give full faith and credit to his amended birth certificate, and denied the
marriage license, stating that Ohio “has a clear public policy that authorizes
and recognizes marriages only between members of the opposite sex.” 508
The court would not interpret male in the state’s marriage statute, to include
a FTM post-operative transsexual.509
Moreover, the complex issues and varied interpretations of legal sex
for the purpose of marriage has had the effect of erasing marriages through
court invalidation, and for all legal purposes, it is as if the marriage never
existed.510 The invalidation of a marriage can have unfortunate consequences
on the right to claim an inheritance when a spouse dies intestate.511 The
Supreme Court of Kansas invalidated the marriage of J’Noel, a posttransition MTF transsexual, to a male, after the husband had died intestate.512
501.
See Littleton v. Prange, 9 S.W.3d 223, 227, 230–31 (Tex. App. 1999);
Corbett, P. 83 at 106.
502.
See Littleton, 9 S.W.3d at 231; Corbett, P.83 at 106.
503.
E.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 25-2-115(4) (2014).
504.
E.g., In re Application for Marriage License for Nash, Nos. 2002-T-0149,
2002-T-0179, 2003 WL 23097095, at *1, 4–5 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 31, 2003).
505.
Nos. 2002-T-0149, 2002-T-0179, 2003 WL 23097095 (Ohio Ct. App.
Dec. 31, 2003).
506.
Id. at *9.
507.
Id. at *1.
508.
Id. at *5.
509.
Id. at *6.
510.
Flynn, supra note 262, at 39–40.
511.
See In re Estate of Gardiner, 42 P.3d 120, 123 (Kan. 2002).
512.
Id. at 123, 137.
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After his father died, the son challenged the validity of the marriage between
his father and J’Noel because J’Noel was born a man.513
Like in In re Application for Marriage License for Nash, the
Supreme Court of Kansas refused to give full faith and credit to J’Noel’s
amended Wisconsin birth certificate for the purpose of upholding the
marriage to her husband.514 However, in J’Noel’s case, it actually had the
effect of invalidating the marriage between J’Noel and her deceased
husband.515
The court concluded that J’Noel was not a woman within the
meaning of Kansas’s marriage statute, and therefore affirmed the lower
court’s ruling that their marriage was void.516 Consequently, the marriage
between J’Noel and her deceased husband was erased; the son was named
the sole heir, and inherited everything.517
Like the MTF transsexual widow in In re Estate of Gardiner,518 an
MTF transsexual widow in Texas also became a legal stranger to her
deceased husband through court invalidation of her marriage.519 In Littleton
v. Prange,520 the court granted a motion for summary judgment, holding that
Christie, an MTF post-transition transsexual, was legally a male and
therefore the marriage between Christie and another male was invalid. 521
Due to the court invalidating the marriage, Christie was unable to bring a
claim under the wrongful death and survival statute because she was no
longer considered the surviving spouse.522 The court held that Christie is a
male even though she had successfully amended the name and sex on her
birth certificate.523 “The trial court . . . granted the petition to amend the
birth certificate” due to an affidavit presented by an “expert stating that
Christie is a female.”524 As the dissent in the case correctly questioned:
How then can the majority conclude that Christie is a male? If
Christie’s evidence that she was female was satisfactory enough
for the trial court to issue an order to amend her original birth
certificate to change both her name and her gender, why is it not
513.
514.

Id. at 123.
Id.; In re Application for Marriage License for Nash, 2003 WL 23097095,

515.
516.
517.
518.
519.
520.
521.
522.
523.
524.

See In re Estate of Gardiner, 42 P.3d at 136–37.
Id.
Id. at 123, 137.
42 P.3d 120 (Kan. 2002).
Littleton v. Prange, 9 S.W.3d 223, 231 (Tex. App. 1999).
9 S.W.3d 223 (Tex. App. 1999).
Id. at 225, 230–31.
Id.
Id. at 231.
Id.

at *9.
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satisfactory enough to raise a genuine question of material fact on
a motion for summary judgment?525

2.

Biological and Psychological Approach

There is another line of cases that have moved away from the rigid
biological test set forth in Corbett, applying an approach to defining legal sex
for the purpose of marriage that incorporates the psychological, emotional,
and social sense of an individual’s gender identity.526 These courts recognize
the ability to change one’s sex and recognize that change of sex in upholding
post-transition marriages.527
In M.T., the Superior Court of New Jersey recognized the role that
gender identity plays in determining sex.528 The court upheld the marriage of
a post-operative MTF transsexual by ruling that she is legally female.529 In
this case, the court rejects the notion that “sex is somehow irrevocably cast at
the moment of birth” and found that the determination involves an analysis
of several criteria. 530 Notably, the court found that “a person’s sex or
sexuality embraces an individual’s gender, . . . one’s self image, the deep
psychological or emotional sense of sexual identity and character.”531
Critical in the court’s determination was finding that there had been
a harmonization between the trans-person’s gender identity and physiology
through SRS. 532 The court stated that she “has become physically and
psychologically unified and fully capable of sexual activity consistent with
her reconciled sexual attributes of gender and anatomy. Consequently,
plaintiff should be considered a member of the female sex for marital
purposes.”533
In a more recent case, the United States District Court for the District
of Minnesota recognized the many components in determining an
individual’s sex and upheld a post-transition marriage. 534 Prior to
525.
Littleton, 9 S.W.3d at 233 (Lopez, J., dissenting).
526.
M.T. v. J.T., 355 A.2d 204, 209 (N.J. Super Ct. App. Div. 1976). But see
Corbett v. Corbett, [1971] P. 83 at 106 (Eng.).
527.
E.g., M.T., 355 A.2d at 211.
528.
Id. at 209.
529.
See id. at 211.
530.
Id. at 209.
531.
Id.
532.
M.T., 355 A.2d at 211.
533.
Id. Similarly, a trial court in California upheld a post-transition marriage,
recognizing the transsexual as their post-operative sex. Flynn, supra note 262, at 36. The
California court based its ruling on a California statute which permits an individual to receive
a new birth certificate after having undergone SRS to reflect his or her new sex. Id.
534.
See Radtke v. Miscellaneous Drivers & Helpers Union Local #638 Health,
Welfare, Eye & Dental Fund, 867 F. Supp. 2d 1023, 1036 (D. Minn. 2012).
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Minnesota’s legalization of same-sex marriage in August 2013, the sex of an
individual—for purposes of marriage—was based on his or her sex at the
time of marriage, not birth. 535 Minnesota also permits birth certificate
amendments for people who have undergone SRS536 and acknowledges that
“[t]here is no basis to conclude that Minnesota recognizes Plaintiff as female
for some purposes—birth records and driver’s licenses, but not for others—
marriage certificates.”537
The courts in New Jersey, California, and Minnesota recognize that
sex can no longer be defined narrowly and “gender identity plays a central
role in determining sex.” 538 While these decisions are favorable, and
certainly an improvement from the rigid approach taken in Corbett, Nash,
and Gardiner, the decisions were very focused on what the New Jersey court
considered harmony between the transsexual’s gender and genitalia.539 The
approach to defining sex for the purposes of marriage in states that prohibit
same-sex marriage has certainly expanded, but is still too focused on sexual
anatomy and biology as definitive of a person’s gender.540
This issue has been addressed in jurisdictions outside of the United
States, and the approach taken by an Australian court is particularly
noteworthy.541 In In re Kevin, (Validity of Marriage of Transsexual), 542 a
FTM transsexual and his wife sought a declaration as to the validity of their
marriage. 543 Prior to their marriage, Kevin, a FTM transsexual, had
undergone hormone treatments, a total hysterectomy and mastectomy, but
did not undergo a phalloplasty and still had a vagina.544 The key difference
in this case from the New Jersey, California, and Minnesota cases, is that
Kevin had not undergone complete sex-reassignment surgery, and therefore,
in the words of the New Jersey court, there was not complete harmony
between gender and genitals. 545 However, the Australian court was not
535.
Id. at 1032.
536.
See MINN. STAT. § 144.218(4) (2013).
537.
Radtke, 867 F. Supp. 2d at 1034.
538.
Id. at 1032; M.T., 355 A.2d at 211; Flynn, supra note 262, at 35–36.
539.
Radtke, 867 F. Supp. 2d at 1032; M.T., 355 A.2d at 211; Flynn, supra note
262, at 35–36; see also In re Estate of Gardiner, 42 P.3d 120, 136 (Kan. 2002); In re
Application for Marriage License for Nash, Nos. 2002-T-0149, 2002-T-0179, 2003 WL
23097095, at *9 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 31, 2003); Corbett v. Corbett, [1971] p.83 at 104 (Eng.).
540.
See M.T., 355 A.2d at 209.
541.
See In re Kevin (Validity of Marriage of Transsexual), [2001] FamCA
1074 ¶ 1 (Austl.).
542.
[2001] FamCA 1074 (Austl.).
543.
Id. ¶ 1.
544.
See id. ¶ 30.
545.
Id. ¶¶ 30, 198; Radtke v. Miscellaneous Drivers & Helpers Union Local
#638 Health, Welfare, Eye & Dental Fund, 867 F. Supp. 2d 1023, 1032 (D. Minn. 2012);
M.T., 355 A.2d at 211; see also Flynn, supra note 262, at 35–36.
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concerned with finding this harmony, and concluded that Kevin was legally
male for the purposes of marriage.546 The court’s determination was based
on expert testimony by psychiatrists who stated that Kevin’s “brain sex or
mental sex is male.”547 The court expressly rejected the approach taken in
Corbett, finding that sex cannot be determined based on any single factor
“such as chromosomes or genital sex,” and stated that to determine a
person’s sex for the purpose of marriage:
[T]he relevant matters include . . . the person’s biological and
physical characteristics at birth . . . the person’s life experiences,
including the sex in which he or she is brought up and the person’s
attitude to it; the person’s self-perception as a man or woman; the
extent to which the person has functioned in society as a man or a
woman; any hormonal, surgical or other medical sex reassignment
treatments the person has undergone . . . and the person’s
biological, psychological and physical characteristics at the time of
the marriage, including—if they can be identified—any biological
features of the person’s brain that are associated with a particular
sex.548

D.

Issues That Arise During Divorce

Even if a transsexual has successfully entered into a valid marriage
recognized as a legal opposite sex marriage, issues may still arise when one
of the spouses file for divorce.549 What should generally be a straightforward
divorce proceeding can turn into a complex judicial determination of the
transsexual’s legal sex and potential invalidation of the marriage.550 This is
the battle that Michael Kantaras—an FTM transsexual—faced when he filed
a petition for dissolution of marriage, and his wife counter petitioned
alleging that their marriage was void because Michael is female and Florida
prohibits same-sex marriage.551 The court agreed, holding that Michael is

546.
In re Kevin (Validity of Marriage of Transsexual), [2001] FamCA 1074 ¶
330; see also M.T., 355 A.2d at 211.
547.
In re Kevin (Validity of Marriage of Transsexual), [2001] FamCA 1074 ¶
244; Flynn, supra note 262, at 35.
548.
In re Kevin (Validity of Marriage of Transsexual), [2001] FamCA 1074 ¶¶
328–330; see also Corbett v. Corbett, [1971] P. 83 at 104 (Eng.).
549.
See Kantaras v. Kantaras, 884 So. 2d 155, 156 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.
2004).
550.
E.g., id. at 156–57.
551.
Id. at 156.
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female and invalidated the marriage. 552 Due to the invalidation of their
marriage, Michael faced an ongoing battle of establishing parental rights.553
More recently, an Arizona judge denied a divorce for Thomas
Beatie—an FTM transsexual—based on the conclusion that he was a female
at the time he married a woman, and due to Arizona’s prohibition on samesex marriage, the marriage was invalid. 554 Beatie is referred to as the
Pregnant Man because he retained female reproductive organs and gave
birth to three children during his marriage.555 He plans to appeal the divorce
denial because “he wants the three children to whom he gave birth to know
their parents’ marriage was legitimate” fearing that his children will “‘see
that [the] court said that’s not your daddy.’”556
It is clear that the sex of an individual is based on many components,
which cannot be determined by biology alone.557 It seems inappropriate, and
rather counter-intuitive, to narrowly define sex of a person as fixed at the
time of his or her birth, when the individual personally and psychologically
identifies differently, has undergone SRS or transition-related treatments, or
even has had his or her certificate changed to reflect his or her new sex.558
Moreover, states that prohibit same-sex marriage, but refuse to acknowledge
the sex change of a transsexual, ultimately permit precisely what the samesex marriage ban was enacted to prevent.559
When the ban on same-sex marriage meets the insistence that legal
sex may not be changed, the result is as fitting as it is ironic: [I]n
these jurisdictions, transgender gay and lesbian couples can . . .
marry. Assume a transsexual woman lives in a state where birth
anatomy—here, a penis—forever defines legal sex. As a legal
male, she is free to marry another woman, even though she, her
partner, and society at large view them as lesbian.560
552.
Id. at 161.
553.
See id.
554.
Associated Press, Arizona Judge Rejects Divorce for Transgender
Pregnant Hawaii Man, Saying He Has No Jurisdiction in Same-Sex Marriage, N.Y. DAILY
NEWS (Mar. 29, 2013, 2:41 PM), http://www.nydailynews.com/news/national/judge-rejectsdivorce-transgender-pregnant-man-article-1.1302675.
555.
Id.; Jacques Billeaud, Transgender Man Plans to Keep Seeking Divorce,
CHARLESTON GAZETTE, Apr. 3, 2013, at A8.
556.
Billeaud, supra note 555.
557.
See supra Part V.
558.
See Littleton v. Prange, 9 S.W.3d 223, 231 (Tex. App. 1999).
559.
Flynn, supra note 262, at 34.
560.
Id. For example, Serafima is a MTF transsexual who is in a relationship
with another woman and considers herself a lesbian. See supra Part V. The jurisdiction that
prohibits same-sex marriage and follows the strict biological approach to defining sex for the
purposes of marriage would permit them to marry, because Serafima was born a male—even
though in reality they are a same-sex couple. See Flynn, supra note 262, at 34; supra Part V.
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The complex issues of determining the validity of a post-transition
marriage would be greatly simplified through same-sex marriage equality by
removing any and all sex pre-qualifications for couples that want to marry.561
However, the states that still prohibit same-sex marriage should follow the
approach taken by the Family Court of Australia, which weighed more
heavily psychological and personal perceptions of an individual’s gender
identity in the determination of legal sex for the purposes of marriage.562
X.

THE RIGHT TO RAISE CHILDREN/PARENTAL RIGHTS

As seen thus far, the struggles faced by the trans community concern
some of the most intimate aspects of life—the right to marry, the right to be
recognized for all legal purposes as the gender one identifies with, the right
to equal health care, and matters concerning child custody and parental
rights.563
Legal ties between a parent and child can be established biologically,
through adoption, or through marriage. 564 Unfortunately, none of these
options for establishing and securing legal ties between a parent and child
seem to hold true when a parent is transgender. 565 The guiding standard
governing child custody disputes is always the best interest of the child.566
Variation exists among the states in the interpretation of the best interest of
the child standard, and judges have broad discretion in weighing factors in
child custody determinations.567
Unfortunately, this standard has been unfairly applied against
transgender parents. 568 Gender identity should not be a factor in custody
determinations or adoption placements, absent special circumstances
indicating a likely negative impact on the child’s best interests. 569
Unfortunately, many courts have denied child custody to a parent based on a
finding that the parent’s gender identity, by itself, would not be in the best
561.
See Flynn, supra note 262, at 40.
562.
See In re Kevin (Validity of Marriage of Transsexual) [2001] FamCA
1074 ¶¶ 43–46 (Austl.); Same-Sex Marriage Fast Facts, supra note 445.
563.
HOWELL, supra note 290, at 2, 12–13, 57, 67–68.
564.
Flynn, supra note 262, at 41–42.
565.
Id. at 42.
566.
E.g., FLA. STAT. § 61.13(2)(c) (2014).
567.
Kari J. Carter, Note, The Best Interest Test and Child Custody: Why
Transgender Should Not Be a Factor in Custody Determinations, 16 HEALTH MATRIX: J.L.–
MED. 209, 209–10 (2006).
568.
See, e.g., Daly v. Daly, 715 P.2d 56, 59–60 (Nev. 1986).
569.
See Kantaras v. Kantaras, 884 So. 2d 155, 161 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.
2004); Kantaras v. Kantaras, No. 98-5375CA, at 294 (Fla. 6th Cir. Ct. 2003).
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interest of the child. 570 Some extreme cases have even gone as far as
terminating a trans person’s parental rights.571
In Daly v. Daly, 572 the Supreme Court of Nevada terminated the
parental rights of Suzanne—formerly known as Tim—the child’s biological
father who underwent SRS.573 The court found that termination of parental
rights were in the child’s best interest due to a “risk of serious physical,
mental, or emotional injury to the child” if she were forced to maintain
visitation with Suzanne.574 The court even went as far to state that “[i]t was
strictly Tim Daly’s choice to discard his fatherhood and assume the role of a
female who could never be either mother or sister to his daughter.”575
In addition to the extreme cases terminating parental rights of a trans
parent, there have been numerous decisions restricting or denying child
custody and visitation rights to a transgender parent.576 For example, the
Missouri Court of Appeals in J.L.S. v. D.K.S.577 reversed the order of joint
custody by the trial court because the father underwent sex-reassignment
surgery. 578 The court determined “that immediate contact between the
children and father would impair the boys’ emotional development.”579
A circuit court in Florida correctly recognized that transgender status
should not be a factor in custody determinations. 580 In Kantaras v.
Kantaras 581 , Michael Kantaras, a FTM transsexual, was married to Linda
Forsythe. 582 Michael adopted Linda’s son from a previous marriage, and
during their marriage Linda gave birth to a daughter through artificial
insemination.583 After nine years of marriage to Linda, Michael filed for a
570.
See, e.g., J.L.S. v. D.K.S., 943 S.W.2d 766, 775 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997);
Cisek v. Cisek, No. 80 C.A. 113, 1982 WL 6161, at *1–2 (Ohio Ct. App. July 20, 1982).
571.
E.g., Daly, 715 P.2d at 60.
572.
715 P.2d 56 (Nev. 1986).
573.
Id. at 57, 60.
574.
Id. at 57–58.
575.
Id. at 59.
576.
See J.L.S. v. D.K.S., 943 S.W.2d 766, 775 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997); Cisek v.
Cisek, No. 80 C.A. 113, 1982 WL 6161, at *1–2 (Ohio Ct. App. July 20, 1982).
577.
943 S.W.2d 766 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997).
578.
Id. at 774–75.
579.
Id. at 772. Similarly, the Court of Appeals of Washington restricted the
parental rights of a transgender father and granted residential placement with the mother,
claiming to base this decision “on the children’s need for ‘environmental and parental
stability.’” In re Marriage of Magnuson, 170 P.3d 65, 67 (Wash. Ct. App. 2007). The court
did not follow the recommendation of the Guardian Ad Litem, who concluded that “Robbie
was the more nurturing and engaged parent, and . . . recommended that the court designate
Robbie as the primary residential parent.” Id. at 68.
580.
See Kantaras v. Kantaras, No. 98-5375CA, at 808 (Fla. 6th Cir. Ct. 2003).
581.
No. 98-5375CA (Fla. 6th Cir. Ct. 2003).
582.
Id. at 2, 4, 11.
583.
Id. at 15, 18–19.
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divorce and sought custody of both children.584 In their custody battle, Linda
argued that Michael had no parental rights over the children because he was
a female.585 She claimed that the adoption of her son was void because it
was done when Florida prohibited gay adoption, and that Michael was not
the biological or legal father of her daughter.586
Surprisingly, a Florida circuit court determined that the marriage was
valid and concluded that it would be in the children’s best interest to remain
in the parental custody of their transgender father.587 The approach taken by
this court, in determining the custody of the children, is particularly
noteworthy because Michael’s transgender status had no impact on the
court’s application of the best interest of the child standard. 588 A
psychologist, who testified about the qualities of a good parent, stated that
there are no concerns about awarding custody to a trans parent as long as he
is a good parent.589 The circuit court’s holding relied heavily on the finding
that “[w]ith respect to the children, being a transsexual does not prevent him
from being a good parent.”590
However, the Second District Court of Appeal of Florida held the
marriage between Michael and Linda as a same-sex marriage, and thus void
ab initio.591 The court’s decision did not reverse the custody determination
of the trial court and instead left that issue for review on remand.592 This
decision unfortunately meant that Michael faced continued litigation in the
fight to protect the parental rights over his children.593 Luckily, the wellknown television celebrity, Dr. Phil, heard about this ongoing case, invited
Michael and Linda on his show, and successfully encouraged them to resolve
the dispute in mediation.594 After two days of mediation, Michael’s battle
was finally over when it was settled that he would retain all of his parental
rights over his two children.595
As demonstrated in In re Marriage of Simmons, 596 judicial
invalidation of marriage can also have devastating effects on the parental
584.
Id. at 2–3, 102, 615.
585.
See id. at 6.
586.
Kantaras, No. 98-5375CA at 4–5, 8.
587.
Id. at 52, 799, 808.
588.
Id. at 52, 799.
589.
Id. at 294.
590.
Id. at 52.
591.
Kantaras v. Kantaras, 884 So. 2d 155, 161 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2004).
592.
Id.
593.
See id.
594.
Case Summary & History, NAT’L CTR. FOR LESBIAN RIGHTS, http://
www.nclrights.org/cases-and-policy/cases-and-advocacy/kantaras-v-kantaras/ (last visited
Aug. 26, 2015).
595.
Id.
596.
825 N.E.2d 303 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005).
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rights of a trans person.597 The marriage of Sterling, a transsexual male, to
his wife Jennifer, was declared invalid as a same-sex marriage and the court
declared sole custody of the child to the wife. 598 During their marriage,
Jennifer underwent artificial insemination, and pursuant to the Parentage Act,
the two of them and their physician signed a contract stating that Sterling is
the natural father of the child born from this procedure. 599 However, the
court awarded custody to Jennifer, finding that Sterling was not biologically
tied to the child and “lacked parental rights or standing to seek custody.”600
In order for the artificial insemination agreement they signed to be
valid, Sterling would have to be a husband and Jennifer, a wife.601 However,
due to the invalidity of their marriage, they were not husband and wife at the
time the agreement was signed, and the court further concluded that the
Parentage Act does not “include[] transsexual males who have signed
artificial insemination agreements as husbands in an invalid same-sex
marriage.”602
The fact that someone is transgender should not affect his or her
parental rights and should not be a factor in the courts application of the best
interest of the child standard.603 Although courts may deny the fact that a
parent’s transgender status had a negative impact on their decision restricting
or terminating parental rights,604 “reading between the lines it is easy for one
to discern a bias against the transgender person and his or her gender
identity.”605 Courts should follow the approach used by the Kantaras court
in determining the best interest of the child in child custody disputes.606 The
focus should be solely on parenting ability, excluding gender identity in that
determination.607 Being a transsexual does not prevent someone from being
a good parent; bias, animus, or a lack of understanding should not restrict or
prevent a person from the right to raise children.608

597.
See id. at 312.
598.
Id. at 307, 311, 315.
599.
Id. at 307.
600.
Id.
601.
In re Marriage of Simmons, 825 N.E.2d at 311.
602.
Id.
603.
See In re Marriage of Magnuson, 170 P.3d 65, 68 (Wash. Ct. App. 2007)
(Kulik, J., dissenting).
604.
See id. at 67.
605.
HOWELL, supra note 290, at 68.
606.
See Kantaras v. Kantaras, 884 So. 2d 155, 161 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.
2004).
607.
Contra In re Marriage of Simmons, 825 N.E.2d at 312–13.
608.
See HOWELL, supra note 290, at 68.
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CONCLUSION

As demonstrated, the American “legal system insists upon a
male/female dichotomy.”609 Further, there are social expectations associated
with what it means to be male and female, and those who fall outside of the
cultural norm for femininity and masculinity are misunderstood, harassed,
discriminated against, and even physically abused. 610 For these reasons,
there is a compelling need for legislative changes and specific legal
protections for the trans community.611 The law should not categorize people
based on his or her chromosomal make-up or attempt to fit an individual into
a narrow category in which he or she may not belong. As shown, the
insistence on legally defining an individual as either male or female creates
difficulties for transsexuals at all stages of his or her life. 612 This binary
classification system has the effect of diminishing the trans person’s
autonomy by refusing to acknowledge and respect him or her for who he or
she is.613 Everyone deserves to be respected and acknowledged for exactly
who they are, an individual, not as a sex. Instead of determining the rights
and protections given to American citizens based on their classification of
either male or female, the law should treat everyone equally—whether a
person is male, female, transgender, intersex, homosexual, bisexual,
pansexual, and so on—we are all individuals, entitled to the same rights,
protections, and respect in society as well as in law.

609.
610.
611.
612.
613.

Stirnitzke, supra note 314, at 289.
See GRANT ET. AL., supra note 20, at 3.
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